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ABSTRACT 
State sponsorship of terrorism, though not as prevalent as in previous decades, is still a 
complex phenomenon our government has yet to adequately address, despite the threat it 
continues to pose to our national security.  Current U.S. policy toward state sponsors of 
terrorism is constrained by a number of laws, which mandate a host of economic and 
diplomatic sanctions be put in place when a state is designated as a sponsor of terrorism.  
As such, policymakers must careful consider all of the complex ramifications before 
labeling an offending state for fear of alienating necessary allies and harming the 
international economy.   
This paper argues a more effective response to state-sponsored terrorism can be 
found through a deeper understanding of the phenomenon.  To this end, a new typology 
for state-sponsored terrorism is presented, offering policymakers a nuanced approach to 
dealing with states that choose to employ terrorist organizations.  The primary benefit of 
such an approach is the inherent flexibility to tailor U.S. response to the precise 
relationship between the terrorist organization and its state sponsor.  States currently on 
the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism and states that should be are 
examined, detailing the shortcomings of current U.S. policy and the advantages of the 
proposed typology. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
State sponsorship of terrorism, though not as prevalent as in previous decades, is 
still a complex phenomenon our government has yet to adequately address, despite the 
threat it continues to pose to our national security.  Historically, our country’s response to 
state-sponsored terrorism has been essentially binary:  the offending state is either on the 
State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, and therefore subject to a host of 
economic sanctions, or it is not.  This approach has been largely ineffective.  The same 
states have remained on the State Department’s list for decades.  A better solution to the 
problem of state sponsorship will only be reached with a deeper understanding of the 
issues.  What are the principal forms of state sponsorship of terrorism?  Does state 
sponsorship vary depending on the relationship between the sponsor state and the terrorist 
organization?  This thesis will tackle these questions.  The answers to these questions 
offer the means of creating a new typology for state sponsorship of international 
terrorism.  A new typology is necessary because, as Grant Wardlaw explains it, “this can 
then be used as a basis for setting out possible strategic rationales for the employment of 
state-sponsored terrorism and, eventually, for determining the level of threat presented to 
vital national interests by various acts of terrorism.”1 
A. IMPORTANCE  
The current unrest in the Middle East makes the issue of state sponsorship more 
urgent.  Fledgling governments now taking root in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and elsewhere 
may view sponsorship as a relatively inexpensive means, both in economic and political 
terms, of establishing themselves in the world arena.  Moreover, they may be unable or 
unwilling to prevent terrorist organizations from establishing a base of operations or 
training camps within their borders.   
Established governments are prone to sponsorship as well.  The recent killing of 
Osama bin Laden less than a mile from a Pakistani military academy also brings this 
                                                 
1 Grant Wardlaw, "Terror as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," in Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. 
David C. Rapoport (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 254–55. 
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issue to the forefront.  Determining who, within the Pakistani government, knew of bin 
Laden’s presence and for how long will undoubtedly demonstrate that gradations of state 
sponsorship still exist.   
B. DEFINITIONS 
The subject of state sponsorship of terrorism invariably begins by grappling with 
the issue of definitions.  In 1984, Schmid and Jongman identified over 100 different 
definitions for terrorism, presenting an often-cited problem with attempting to develop 
counter terrorism strategy: the lack of a common lexicon.2  In a more recent 
collaboration, the same authors cite 22 definitions, demonstrating progress, but a 
continued disparity among academics and policymakers.3  Since the focus of this paper is 
on creating a practical typology for our country's policymakers, I will use the State 
Department's accepted definition listed in U.S. Code Title 22, Section 2656f, which states 
terrorism is “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”  It goes on to define 
international terrorism as “terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one 
country.”4   
The State Department describes state sponsors of terrorism as “countries 
determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of 
international terrorism.”5  The law presupposes material support, even though it does not 
expressly describe it as such.  However, the law is very explicit about one particular form 
of sponsorship.  According to the U.S. Code, support includes, “the recurring use of any 
part of the territory of the country as a sanctuary for terrorists and terrorist 
                                                 
2Alex P. Schmid and A. J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, 
Data Bases and Literature (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1984), 119–58. 
3 Alex P. Schmid and A. J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, 
Data Bases, Theories, & Literature (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 32–37. 
4 U.S. State Department. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, "2008 Country Reports on 
Terrorism," (2009). 
5 U.S. State Department. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, "State Sponsors of 
Terrorism,"  http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm (accessed August 5, 2011). 
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organizations,” whether the government, “expressly consents to, or with knowledge, 
allows, tolerates, or disregards such use of its territory.”6     
It is important to clarify that state sponsorship of terrorism is distinct from the 
phenomenon often called state terrorism.  The latter encompasses repressive acts 
employed by agents of the state to suppress its own citizens, such as the “dirty war” that 
took place in Argentina in the late 1970s.7 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is general agreement on when state sponsorship of terrorism came to the 
forefront of U.S. policy.  Multiple authors cite the roots of state-sponsored terrorism in 
the Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979, the Soviet Union’s liberal use of terrorist 
organizations as means of implementing foreign policy during the Cold War, and 
President Reagan’s aggressive response during the 1980s.8  However, beginning in the 
mid-1990s, some experts began commenting on a change in the nature of terrorist 
organizations and international terrorism.  Specifically, they noted the employment of 
terrorism more as the end in itself rather than a means to achieve specific political goals.9  
This shift to what would come to be called “new terrorism” also included amateur “lone 
wolf” terrorists operating individually or in small cells with very little outside help as 
opposed to the hierarchical organizations that often relied on support from state 
governments.10  While some experts argue the advent of “new terrorism” marginalized 
                                                 
6 50 U.S.C. § 2405. 
7 María José Moyano, Argentina's Lost Patrol: Armed Struggle, 1969–1979 (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1995), Chapters 5 and 6. 
8 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 258; Daniel 
Byman, Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 1, 79; Wardlaw, "Terror as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," 237-41.  For a detailed account of our 
country’s counter terrorism efforts during the 1980s, see:  David C. Martin and John Walcott, Best Laid 
Plans: The inside Story of America's War against Terrorism (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988). 
9 Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorism Trends and Prospects," in Countering the New Terrorism, ed. Ian O. 
Lesser (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 8-10, 12; Walter Laqueur, "Postmodern Terrorism," Foreign 
Affairs 75, no. 5 (1996): 25; Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response 
(London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 50. 
10 Hoffman, "Terrorism Trends and Prospects," 20–24; Laqueur, "Postmodern Terrorism," 34; Marc 
Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 109–12. 
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state sponsorship, several “new terrorism” advocates continued to assert the prominent 
role it plays.11  While the debate surrounding “new terrorism” continues, more recent 
events, such as Afghanistan’s support of al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden being located 
and killed in Pakistan; demonstrate that state sponsorship of terrorism persists today.12     
Despite our country’s preoccupation with state sponsorship of terrorism since the 
1970s, academic literature on the subject is less than substantial.  Indeed, the bulk of it 
focuses on specific cases of sponsorship without making broad generalizations.  Those 
that have arrived at some form of typology have generally approached the task from one 
of three perspectives: the methods of state sponsorship, the level of involvement between 
the sponsor state and the terrorist organization, and the offending state’s objectives or 
motivations for providing support.  Interestingly, the most succinct typologies with 
practical application for policymakers come from the legal arena.  However, the scope of 
the literature from this perspective tends to focus on the appropriate use of military force 
within the context of international law.  Therefore, the typologies offered typically 
address state involvement but do not identify the specific methods of sponsorship that are 
also necessary to sufficiently categorize an offending state.   
An excellent example is Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Richard Erickson’s 
Legitimate Use of Military Force against State-Sponsored International Terrorism.  
Colonel Erickson identified and defined four levels of state involvement ranging from 
inaction, where the “state does not wish to ignore international terrorists within its 
borders but lacks the ability…to respond effectively,” to sponsorship, “when a state 
directly uses international terrorism.”13  In between, under the category of state support, 
he lists forms of support as “training, arms, explosives, equipment, intelligence, safe 
                                                 
11 Hoffman, "Terrorism Trends and Prospects," 14–15; Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 258–67; Laqueur, 
"Postmodern Terrorism," 26–27. 
12 Counterarguments to the concept of "new terrorism" include:  Martha Crenshaw, "'New' Vs. 'Old' 
Terrorism:  A Critical Appraisal," in Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge in Europe, ed. R. 
Coolsaet (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008); David Tucker, "What Is New About the New Terrorism and 
How Dangerous Is It?," Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 3 (2001). 
13 Richard J. Erickson, Legitimate Use of Military Force against State-Sponsored International 
Terrorism (Air University Press, 1989), 26. 
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havens, communications, travel documents, financing, or other logistical support.”14  
Later in the book, he addresses specific occasions when use of force is allowed by 
international law, but never addresses when other instruments of power may be warranted 
or more appropriate.  While this typology is incomplete, it serves as the starting point of 
this thesis. 
Some authors provide a more nuanced typology by further dividing the spectrum 
of state involvement.  One example of this is in “The International Community’s ’Legal’ 
Response to Terrorism” by Antonio Cassese.  In this article, Cassese proposes a spectrum 
similar to Erickson’s, but divided into six parts, including one characterized by states that 
provide logistical support and one for states that provide financial aid or weapons.15  
However, he does not adequately define what constitutes logistical support or financial 
aid and, like his legal counterparts, does not describe the policy implications for 
instruments of power other than military force. 
Literature in the academic arena offers a broader perspective but little 
advancement on the concept of a typology.  Noted terrorism expert Brian Jenkins cites 
the multiple benefits of state sponsorship to the organization to include “money, 
sophisticated munitions, intelligence, and technical expertise.”16  Bruce Hoffman in his 
book, Inside Terrorism, asserts sponsorship offers terrorists organizations the “resources 
of an established nation state’s entire diplomatic, military, and intelligence apparatus.”17  
David Tucker also provides a careful analysis of state sponsorship in his book, Skirmishes 
at the Edge of Empire.18  However, all three, like many academics researching the 
subject, recount individual cases of sponsorship and focus the majority of their analysis 
on the implications to the U.S., without codifying an overarching typology. 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
15 Antonio Cassese, "The International Community's "Legal" Response to Terrorism," International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1989): 598. 
16 Brian Michael Jenkins, "Defense against Terrorism," Political Science Quarterly 101, no. 5 (1986): 
589. 
17 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 259. 
18 David Tucker, Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United States and International Terrorism 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997). 
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In his book Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, Paul Pillar takes the discussion of 
a typology further and offers a slightly different perspective.  He identifies three very 
broad categories of state sponsorship based upon the relationship between the U.S. and 
other states.  These three categories constitute a spectrum describing the “role of foreign 
countries in terrorism and counterterrorism.”19  On one end of the spectrum is the “state 
sponsor,” identified by their designation on the State Department’s list of state sponsors 
of terrorism.  The next category is “enabler,” which essentially applies to U.S. friends or 
allies that fail to cooperate fully with U.S. counter-terrorism efforts or do “some things 
that help enable [terrorism] to occur.”20  Finally, there are “cooperators,” or those 
countries who willingly support U.S. counter terrorism efforts.21 
However, Pillar places a large caveat on his categorization by stating the 
“tendency to think of sponsorship in distinct categories has hampered the making of 
effective counterterrorist policy.”22  He essentially believes a typology is only needed 
insofar as to have a productive conversation on the topic.  A more in-depth examination, 
in his opinion, would only muddy the waters. 
Daniel Byman, one of the most prolific writers on the subject, performs a 
comprehensive analysis of the topic in his book, Deadly Connections.  Taking many of 
the principles he introduced in the RAND report “Trends in Outside Support for 
Insurgent Movements,” Byman identifies six specific forms of support for state 
sponsorship in addition to describing the motivations behind state sponsorship, its effects 
on the terrorist organization, and potential policy alternatives for the victim state.23  
Byman’s six categories of support are, “training and operations; money, arms, and 
logistics; diplomatic backing; organizational assistance; ideological direction; 
                                                 
19 Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 157. 
20 Ibid., 179. 
21 Ibid., 186. 
22 Ibid., 157. 
23 Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2001), 84–95; Byman, Deadly Connections, 59. 
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and…sanctuary.”24  However, he does not describe how the existence of these six 
categories offers a means of discouraging their use. 
Byman attempts to take this argument further in an analysis paper entitled “The 
Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism.” 25  In it, he describes “a spectrum of 
sponsorship” that ranges from “direct control to support through incapacity.”26  
Furthermore, he distinguishes between active support as “deliberate state support” and 
passive as “support provided by non-state actors acting as a component of the state or 
without the state’s opposition.”27  However, some of the definitions utilized in the paper 
are at odds with those used in the previous book.  Furthermore, the vagueness of the 
proposed categories of sponsorship, and the fact they are not linked to specific methods 
of support, make this typology impractical for use by policymakers.  Nonetheless, 
Byman’s analysis is the most complete to date and serves as another crucial source for 
this thesis. 
Very rarely in the literature is the level of state involvement with the terrorist 
organization characterized by the types of support it provides.  In one case, Israeli author 
and counter-terrorism expert Boaz Ganor identifies six categories of support ranging 
from the lowest level of state involvement to the highest.  In increasing order of 
importance, those categories are ideological, financial, military, operational, “initiating 
and directing terrorist attacks,” and “perpetuating direct attacks by government 
agencies.”28  In addition, Ganor describes the spectrum of state involvement by 
distinguishing between the “terrorist state,” the “state supporting terrorism,” the “state 
                                                 
24 Byman, Deadly Connections, 59. 
25 Daniel Byman, "The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism," Saban Center for Middle 
East Policy at the Brookings Institution, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/05_terrorism_byman/05_terrorism_byman.pdf 
(accessed January 15, 2011). 
26 Ibid., 3. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Boaz Ganor, "Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism," International Policy Institute for Counter-
Terrorism, http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/701/currentpage/34/Default.aspx (acccessed 
August 9, 2011). 
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operating terrorism,” and the “state perpetuating terrorism.”29  While this typology is the 
closest to being complete, the confusing terms once again make it cumbersome to use. 
D. TOWARDS A NEW TYPOLOGY: LEVELS OF INVOLVEMENT 
An understanding of why states seek to sponsor terrorist organizations leads to the 
question:  “What kind of relationship does a state foster with a terrorist organization?”  
Historically, U.S. policymakers have overlooked this question, arguing that any support 
for terrorism is unacceptable and therefore a zero tolerance policy on state sponsorship 
must be enforced.  While this statement may be appealing to an extent, knowing the level 
of involvement between the state and terrorist organization offers policymakers the 
means to identify a precise response. 
1. A Spectrum Rather than Distinct Categories 
Rather than treating sponsorship as an “all-or-nothing” classification, it is more 
accurate to describe it as a spectrum.  Similar to those described by Byman and Ganor, 
Figure 1 depicts the spectrum of involvement between the state and the terrorist 
organization.  This spectrum is bounded by “Incapacity,” meaning the state possesses no 
capability to assist or impede the terrorist organization that is operating within its borders, 
and “Direct Control,” meaning the state exercises complete control over the organization, 
to include ideology and operations.  The left side of the spectrum is generally 
characterized by the terrorist organization benefiting from the host state's inaction.  
Progressing to the right, the state becomes more involved with the terrorist organization 
by providing an increasing quantity and quality of tangible goods and services.   
 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
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Figure 1.   Spectrum Depicting the Level of Involvement Between a State Sponsor and a 
Terrorist Organization 
The step beyond complete incapacity is “Toleration.”  This occurs when the state 
is aware of terrorist activity within its borders and supports the terrorist agenda through 
willful inaction.  The next level of involvement is “Support.”  Here the state is actively 
providing a tangible form of support to the organization, but exercises no control over the 
organization’s actions.  As the quantity and type of state support becomes increasingly 
valuable to the terrorist organization, the state begins to actively exercise a higher amount 
of control over the organization's activities and, in some cases, its ideology.  This level is 
described as “Sponsorship.” 
2.  Incapacity 
A state may unwillingly support a terrorist organization simply because it does 
not completely control its territory.  Such support is characterized as “Incapacity” on the 
spectrum of involvement.  The classic example of this phenomenon is Lebanon in the 
1970s.  Rocked with civil war and constant meddling by Syria, Lebanon “was partitioned 
among warlords and generals, militias and armies, much like the turf of urban gangs.”30  
As such, the government, to the extent it actually existed, was unable to prevent various 
Palestinian terrorist groups from establishing bases of operation within its territory.  From 
these bases, terrorist groups would “stage guerilla raids and mortar attacks into northern 
Israel.”31  After several years of bearing these attacks with no assistance from the 
                                                 
30 Walcott, Best Laid Plans, 86. 
31 Jeffrey D. Simon, The Terrorist Trap: America's Experience with Terrorism (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1994), 172–73. 
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Lebanese government, Israel went on the offensive in 1982.  In a rapid military action, 
the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) swept into southern Lebanon and occupied the country 
for several years.32  This action occurred, again, with little assistance or hindrance from 
the Lebanese government, further demonstrating the state's incapacity to act within its 
own territory. 
3. Toleration 
“Incapacity” becomes “Toleration” when the state possesses the capability to 
inhibit the terrorist organization, but, for various reasons, chooses not to.  A prime 
example of toleration is Canada and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).  
LTTE's purpose is “to establish an independent state including the ethnically Tamil 
regions of [Sri Lanka].”33  However, there are sizable Tamil populations scattered all 
over the world.  In particular, Canada has become home to approximately 200,000 
Tamils, 90% of them living in Toronto.34  Beginning in the 1990s, LTTE realized its 
efforts required international assistance and began sending operatives to other countries 
to organize the Tamil diaspora and send funds and weapons back to Sri Lanka.  As of 
2004, the Snow Tigers, the Canadian branch of LTTE, was one of the largest foreign 
bases of support raising as much as $1 million per month.35  Snow Tiger fundraising 
activities in Canada included going door-to-door in Tamil neighborhoods, rallies held in 
Canadian cities, Tamil cultural events, and various “charitable” organizations.36  In 2006, 
Conservatives banned the LTTE, yet the organization continues to wield considerable 
power within Canadian politics.37  To date, political pressures and liberal courts have so 
                                                 
32Walcott, Best Laid Plans, 86–89. 
33 Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Foreign Terrorist Organizations," (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service, 2004), 61. 
34 Sarah Wayland, "Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities: The Sri Lankan 
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36 Ibid., 38–43. 
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far stymied any efforts to prevent LTTE fundraising in Canada.38  It appears democratic 
values are LTTE's greatest ally in the country.   
4. Support 
When a state takes action that benefits a terrorist organization and begins to offer 
tangible forms of assistance, “Toleration” becomes “Support.”  In the 1980s, Libya and 
its maniacal leader, Colonel Muamar Qaddafi, were the leading supporters of terrorism.  
One of the main benefactors of this support was the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(PIRA).  Stating, “We do not consider the IRA a terrorist organization,” rather, “noble 
strugglers,” Qaddafi provided massive amounts of weaponry to the PIRA.39  According 
to multiple sources, during the mid-1980s the PIRA “took delivery of some five to ten 
tons of Semtex-H plastic explosive..., in addition to one hundred twenty tons of other 
arms and explosives, including twelve SAM-7 ground-to-air missiles, stocks of RPG-7 
rocket propelled grenades, and anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns.”40   
The distinction between “Support” and the next higher level on the involvement 
spectrum, “Sponsorship,” can be determined by three key characteristics:  the form of 
support provided by the state, the quantity of support provided by the state, and the 
connection between the state and the terrorist organization.  In the case of Libya, the 
weapons provided to the PIRA in four shipments between 1985 and 1986 were of 
military grade, of current vintage, and in large quantities.  However, the only other arms 
shipment of this magnitude came in 1973, and British forces intercepted it.  The Libyan 
government provided financial support to the PIRA on various occasions throughout the 
1970s and 1980s.  But the funds were modest compared to the estimated $40 million in 
weapons, “equivalent to five times the [P]IRA’s total annual budget,” the organization 
                                                 
38 Bell, Cold Terror, 54–60. 
39 Brendan O'Brien, The Long War: The I.R.A. And Sinn Fein, 1985 to Today (New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 1993), 138. 
40 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 264; J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: The I.R.A. (New Brunswick, 
N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 568–72; O'Brien, The Long War: The I.R.A. And Sinn Fein, 1985 to 
Today, 135–38. 
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was set to receive by the end of 1987.41  Moreover, Libya had no ideological ties to the 
PIRA.  The true motives behind Qaddafi's support were essentially to punish the U.S. and 
the U.K for its actions.  The PIRA was merely a proxy through which Qaddafi could 
strike the U.K.  These reasons place Libya and its involvement with the PIRA squarely in 
the “Support” category on the spectrum.42   
5. Sponsorship 
An excellent example of “Sponsorship” is the relationship between Pakistan and 
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT).  Formed in the early 1990s, LT's proclaimed purpose was 
“freeing Kashmir from Indian control and establishing an Islamic state there.”43  
However, recent LT actions imply the group is seeking to extend the Islamic state over 
India as well.44  Today LT is considered one of the most effective and “fearsome jihadi 
force” operating in the Kashmir.45 
Pakistan supported LT through a myriad of means.  Throughout the 1990s, 
Pakistan allowed LT to establish training centers in Lahore, Sialkot, and Islamabad.46  
“This haven allowed [LT] to train, plan, proselytize, and enjoy a respite from Indian 
counterinsurgency efforts.”47  Furthermore, it is common knowledge that the Pakistani 
Inter-Services Intelligence agency, known as ISI, provided “arms, ammunition, supplies 
for combat, financial aid, and training” to LT and other Kashmiri insurgent groups.48  In 
                                                 
41 Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the I.R.A. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 20. 
42 On Qaddafi’s relationship with the IRA, see: O'Brien, The Long War: The I.R.A. And Sinn Fein, 
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addition to the hawalas, unlicensed moneychangers known to be rampant within 
Pakistan, state-sanctioned charities offered LT additional sources of revenue.49   
What places Pakistan beyond “Support” and into the “Sponsorship” level on the 
spectrum of involvement is the amount of control it maintains over LT.  In the terrorist 
group’s formative years in the early-1990s, Pakistan exercised considerable power over 
the organization's operations.  Since then, the organization, with the help of its state 
sponsor, significantly expanded and eventually assumed more control over its own 
actions.  Pakistan's extensive support of LT continued and included Pakistani soldiers 
training recruits, massive financing operations within Pakistan, and critical bases that 
militants in Kashmir could call back, “to gain tactical guidance, acquire supplies, and 
execute plans.”50  It is this consistently high quality and continuous level of support that 
offers Pakistan the means to influence LT, distinguishing Pakistan and its relationship 
with LT from Libya and the PIRA.   
6. Direct Control 
The relationship between Iran and Hizballah provides the clearest example of 
“Direct Control.”  Hizballah traces its roots to Iran's “Islamic Revolution” in 1979.  
Shortly after seizing power, the Khomeini regime identified key states within the Middle 
East with sizable Shi’ite populations ripe for continuing the revolution.  In 1982, the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was dispatched to Lebanon to assist the 
Shi’ite population so they “might hoist the banner of the Iranian revolution.”51  
Coordinating with Iranian intelligence and diplomatic service, the IGRC consolidated the 
various Shi’ite organizations and formed Hizballah.52  Funds supplied to the organization 
were first devoted to re-establishing the religious school system.  Then social institutions 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 146; U.S. State Department. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, "2008 Country 
Reports on Terrorism." 
50 Byman, Deadly Connections, 169. 
51 Shaul Shay, The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and Palestinian Terror (New Brunswick, NJ: 
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52 Byman, Deadly Connections, 83. 
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such as hospitals were gradually included.53  As the social system developed, local 
clerics, assisted by the IRGC, “established their Lebanese headquarters in Baalbek, and 
together they formed the first Hizballah military units in the Beqa’.”54  Being so 
intimately involved with the establishment of the organization solidified Iran’s control of 
its ideology. 
Material support from Iran has come in myriad forms.  The State Department's 
Country Reports on Terrorism has consistently documented Iran as providing “funding, 
safe haven, training, and weapons” to Hizballah as well as other terrorist organizations.55  
The latest report notes “Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support to 
Hizballah in Lebanon and has trained thousands of Hizballah fighters at camps in Iran.”56  
Bruce Hoffman, citing American intelligence sources, notes, “During 1996 at least three 
747 jumbo cargo jets were landing in Damascus every month ferrying weapons sent by 
Tehran to its minions in Hezbollah.”57  
Evidence of Iran's power over the organization is also well documented.  In the 
early years of the organization, Hussein al-Musawi, “one of the most radical spokesmen 
of Hizballah,” publicly proclaimed, “We pledge our loyalty to the Imam Khomeini, 
politically, religiously and theologically.  In accordance with Khomeini's teachings, we 
strive to fight...all the elements fighting against Muslims...East and West alike.”58  
Similar public proclamations by the organizations leadership were made throughout the 
late-1980s.59  Furthermore, Magnus Ranstorp notes the multitude of personal 
relationships linking the leadership of Hizballah, Iranian clerical leaders, and ranking 
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members of the IRGC.60  These relationships played an instrumental role in Hizballah’s 
more spectacular operations, like the hijacking of TWA flight 847 in 1985.61  The 
considerable control Iran has over Hizballah places the country in the “Direct Control” 
category. 
E. TOWARDS A NEW TYPOLOGY: METHODS OF SPONSORSHIP 
The second principal component to a complete typology of state-sponsored 
terrorism answers the question, “How do states support terrorist organizations?”  The 
forms of support a state provides a terrorist organization can be generally classified into 
four categories:  financing, government services, logistics, and safe havens.  Additionally, 
each category of support can be described as a spectrum.  For example, a government can 
financially support a terrorist organization by allowing the group to fundraise within its 
borders on the low end of the spectrum or transfer millions of dollars directly into the 
group’s coffers on the high end.  Furthermore, the type and extent of support the state 
provides the terrorist organization directly corresponds to the level of involvement 
between the two.  For example, a state that allows a terrorist organization to operate 
within its borders because it refuses to employ counter-terrorism measures, but does not 
otherwise support the organization would fall within the “Toleration” category.  Whereas 
a state that furnishes the terrorist organization with funds and weapons would fall into the 
“Support” category.  The complete relationship is detailed in Figure 2. 
                                                 
60 Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1997), 36, 61. 
61 Ibid., 96, 99; Walcott, Best Laid Plans, 161–234; Shay, The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and 
Palestinian Terror, 104–05. 
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Figure 2.   Complete Typology for State Sponsorship of Terrorism 
1. Financial Support 
The financing category encompasses any form of financial support provided by 
the state to the terrorist organization.  As discussed earlier, an example from this category 
falling in the range of “Toleration” includes a state allowing a diaspora to fundraise on 
behalf of the terrorist organization, the Snow Tigers being a case in point.  Obviously this 
implies the state is aware of the organization’s fundraising efforts and the state 
government willfully disregards or consents to these operations.  If the state is unaware of 
the terrorist organization’s activities or is unable to curtail them, the relationship is better 
described as “Incapacity.”  “Toleration” becomes “Support” when the state begins 
devoting its own resources to the fundraising efforts.  For example, the state establishes 
and operates a distinct entity for the express purpose of fundraising on behalf of the 
terrorist organization.  “Sponsorship” occurs when the state transfers sizable amounts of 
money directly to the terrorist organization, whether through official banking channels or 
through third parties. 
2. Government Services 
The government services category entails the state providing goods or services to 
the terrorist organization that are unique to a state government.  This can be a wide 
variety of the things to include passports and other diplomatic services, training in 
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military-grade weaponry or intelligence collection, or political support in the public 
arena.  A form of “Toleration” in this category would be state bureaucrats allowing their 
employees to distribute passports and visas to terrorist organizations attempting to travel.  
Again, this presumes senior leadership is aware of this practice and chooses to ignore or 
condone it.  An example of “Support,” which entails a higher-level of involvement from 
the government, might include a state deliberately allowing a terrorist cell unfettered 
transit through its territory.  Finally, “Sponsorship” occurs when a state directly provides 
terrorist organizations with elements critical for operations such as key intelligence or 
training required for an attack. 
3. Logistics 
As the name implies, the “Logistics” category includes all forms of logistical 
support for the terrorist organization.  The most obvious and historically rampant 
example is weaponry.  However, other instances might include facilitating the transport 
of people via bus or plane to terrorist training camps.  At the “Toleration” end of the 
spectrum, a state might knowingly allow the black market to thrive within its territory, 
allowing terrorist organizations to equip themselves.  Progressing to “Support,” the state 
may provide surplus or out-dated military-grade weaponry to the terrorist organization.  
States providing large quantities of advanced weaponry or possibly weapons of mass 
destruction would then fall in “Sponsorship” end of the spectrum. 
4. Safe Haven 
Arguably, the most important form of support a state can offer is a safe haven.  A 
state allowing terrorists to freely exist within its borders offers the organization the ability 
to focus its efforts on activities beyond mere survival, ultimately making the organization 
more lethal.  A form of “Toleration” in this category might be a state simply not 
formulating and implementing a counter-terrorism strategy thereby allowing a terrorist 
organization to organize itself within the state’s territory.  Because of the state’s inaction, 
the organization is allowed to establish itself.  “Support” then manifests as the state 
begins to take actions that protect the terrorist element within its borders, such as refusing 
to arrest and extradite accused terrorists to another state for prosecution.  Finally, 
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“Sponsorship” entails the state facilitating the terrorist organization’s plans to establish 
an extensive base of operations or training camps within the country’s borders.     
F. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEANS OF SUPPORT AND THE LEVEL 
OF INVOLVEMENT 
The cases of state sponsorship discussed earlier demonstrate the relationship 
between the means of support provided by the state and the level of involvement between 
the state and the terrorist organization.  States unwilling to deepen their relationship with 
the terrorist organization because of differing ideologies or divergent motivations will 
limit the types of support they provide the terrorists.  Similarly, terrorist organizations 
with motivations and ideologies closely aligned with the state are likely to receive a 
higher-level of support in terms of type and quantity of resources.  For example, 
involvement between Libya and the PIRA would likely not progress from “Support” to 
“Sponsorship” due to differing ideologies.  Qaddafi aided IRA terrorists not because he 
sympathized with their cause but because he wished to harm Britain.  It is important to 
note that around the same time, the dictator was providing substantially more assistance 
to other terrorist organizations more closely aligned to his ideology, like the Abu Nidal 
Organization (ANO).   
This point demonstrates the practicality of the proposed typology as opposed to 
current U.S. policy.  The principal problem with U.S. policy is that it fails to 
acknowledge the gradations that exist in state-sponsored terrorism.  As such, our current 
policy has effectively become a club with which we threaten other states who may 
support the terrorist organizations that plot against our country.  Wardlaw cogently states, 
“The assertion that this or that state is a sponsor of international terrorism increasingly is 
being wielded as a propaganda weapon and as a foreign policy tool itself.”62  The 
examples presented in this paper demonstrate the fact that a wide range of involvement 
between the state sponsor and the terrorist organization exists.  Common sense would 
seem to dictate graduated responses, employing all forms of state power, for 
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commensurate levels of involvement would be more effective than an “all-or-nothing” 
approach. 
The proposed typology suits the fluid nature of international relations.  A state 
that possesses the capacity to form and implement an effective counter terrorism strategy 
will not fall within the spectrum.  States that are characterized by “Incapacity” would be 
eligible for economic and diplomatic aid, as opposed to sanctions, in order to assist with 
their governance issues.  States falling in the “Toleration” category, including allies, will 
have to answer for their ambivalence or suffer low-level diplomatic or economic 
sanctions along with the stigma of being a country that tolerates terror.  “Support” and 
“Sponsorship” of terrorism necessitate an increasingly higher order of diplomatic and 
economic sanctions along with the possibility of military action.  “Direct Control” of a 
terrorist organization implies the organization is acting as an agent of the state, and as 
such, any action taken by the terrorist organization can be considered an act of war. 
Obviously, the complexity of international relations will require policymakers to 
make refinements to the employment of the typology.  A state might be involved with 
more than one organization, each at a different level of support.  For example, Libya 
“Supported” the PIRA while it “Sponsored” ANO.  Moreover, the forms of support from 
the state to a single terrorist organization might equate to different levels of involvement.  
One such example is discussed in Chapter II.  Syria offers a significant safe haven to 
HAMAS, but provides little in the way of financing or logistics.  Both examples present a 
challenge to the policymakers who must determine which label presents the most 
accurate description of the state-terrorist organization relationship.  However, the primary 
advantage of the proposed typology over current U.S. policy is its flexibility.  As such, 
graduated levels of response provide policymakers options to tailor the response to the 
offending state.  Logically, the highest level of support would be applied to the offending 
state, but U.S. response might be tempered based on mitigating circumstances.       
G.  THESIS OVERVIEW 
The next chapter begins with an analysis of the laws that direct U.S. policy on 
state-sponsored terrorism.  This analysis describes the ramifications of placement on the 
 20 
State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism and provides evidence of the 
inflexibility of the current policy.  Then the current list of state sponsors is surveyed, 
tracing when and why each state was added to the State Department’s list and the results 
of its inclusion.  Following the discussion of each state on the list, a specific state-
terrorist organization relationship is examined within the framework of the proposed 
typology.  This exercise shows differences between the proposed typology and current 
U.S. policy, demonstrating the efficacy of a more nuanced approach.  For example, 
examining the relationship between Syria and HAMAS demonstrates that even though 
the state is an active sponsor of the terrorist organization, the forms of support provided 
require a different response than that of Iran and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  
Chapter III applies the proposed typology to states that are currently not on the 
State Department’s list of state sponsors.  First, Libya and North Korea, two recently 
removed countries that were on the list for decades, are examined, demonstrating the 
convoluted way states are removed from the State Department’s list.  Then, the typology 
is applied to Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.  These three states have never been 
on the list of state sponsors but have sponsored terrorist organizations in the past and may 
continue to do so.  The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate that a graduated 
approach to state sponsorship of terrorism is applicable to every state, making it more 
relevant than the current approach. 
The final chapter first presents the United States’ own problems with state-
sponsored terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s.  A new law offering a distinction between 
states that sponsor terrorism and those that tolerate its existence is reviewed, specifically 
examining its strengths and weaknesses.  A summary of the benefits to policymakers of 
the proposed typology is followed by a figure comparing the State Department’s list of 
State Sponsors of terrorism and the proposed typology.  Finally, future areas of research 
are discussed. 
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II. CURRENT U.S. POLICY: THE STATE DEPARTMENT’S LIST 
OF STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM 
One of the most enduring examples of U.S. counter-terrorism efforts is the State 
Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism.  The list serves the important function of 
formally identifying states with a proven record of supporting international terrorist 
organizations.  However, in the three decades since the list was created, Congress has 
attached a host of economic and diplomatic sanctions that are automatically triggered by 
inclusion on the list.  These sanctions are meant to make the cost of supporting terrorism 
as a means of foreign policy too high for the potential state sponsor.  Instead, they have 
made U.S. foreign policy inflexible and ineffective.   
This chapter briefly reviews the history of the State Department’s list of state 
sponsors of terrorism.  Examining the gradual escalation of economic sanctions over the 
past three decades, it argues that the state sponsor list has severe shortcomings as an 
instrument of foreign policy.  U.S. military options and their failures are also briefly 
reviewed.  The chapter then surveys each of the countries currently named on the State 
Department's list of state sponsors.  Examining each of these countries in detail involves 
addressing two questions.  First, how does the State Department identify states for 
inclusion on the list?  Understanding the decision calculus behind the inclusion of a 
particular state provides a glimpse into the intent of policymakers and their foreign policy 
agenda.  Second, how has the offending state acted after its inclusion to the list?  
Answering this question provides evidence of the ineffectiveness of current U.S. foreign 
policy towards state sponsors of terrorism.  After examining this relationship between 
policymaker intent and the results of the offending state’s inclusion to the list, the 
proposed typology is applied to the same state and terrorist organization to demonstrate 
its efficacy over current U.S. policy. 
A. HISTORY AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE STATE SPONSOR OF 
TERRORISM DESIGNATION 
Following World War II, the U.S. sought economic solutions such as sanctions 
and trade restrictions as a means of coercing certain behaviors from other states.  In 1949, 
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Congress provided “the president the power to regulate all foreign commerce as a tool of 
foreign policy through the Export Administration Act of 1949 (EAA).”63  Seeking 
avenues to curb the growing trend in terrorism when the EAA was up for renewal in the 
1970s, Congress enacted new provisions to the EAA to deal with the advent of state 
sponsorship.  Specifically, Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA) 
requires the Secretary of State to identify countries that “have repeatedly provided 
support for acts of international terrorism.”64  Offending states are recorded in the Federal 
Register.  Companies dealing in “the export of military relevant goods or technology” 
that wish to trade with designated countries must obtain a license from the State 
Department, with the approval of Congress.65  The bureaucratic hurdles for obtaining a 
license for such “dual use” technology make trade with the designated country highly 
unlikely.   
The EAA also provides a means for countries to be removed from the list.  The 
President must submit a report to Congress to initiate the process.  The report must certify 
that “a fundamental change in leadership and policies” has occurred within the offending 
state and it no longer supports terrorism or the state “has not provided any support for 
international terrorism during the preceding 6-month period.”66  In either case, the 
government concerned must provide “assurances that it will not support acts of 
international terrorism in the future.”67  In the 22 years the EAA has been in effect, the 
above provisions have been utilized five times to remove a country from the list.  One 
state, Iraq, was returned to the list less than a decade later.  By comparison, four states 
have been added to the list in the same amount of time.68  
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Along with the EAA, the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) attaches additional 
penalties for inclusion on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list.  Provisions under the FAA 
prohibit financial assistance provided under the Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act,69 the Peace Corps Act,70 and the Export-Import Bank Act71 to any 
country designated as a state sponsor by the Secretary of State as described in the EAA.   
In 1990, a third element was added to the array of sanctions against state sponsors 
of terrorism with the passage of amendments to the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).72  
The act expressly prohibits the export of items on the U.S. Munitions List.  The intended 
purpose of the act was to prevent “the international proliferation of nuclear devices to 
individuals or groups,”73 reflecting the growing concerns at the end of the Cold War of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) falling into the hands of terrorists. 
Together, the three statutes described above serve as the United States’ primary 
mechanism for containing state sponsors of terrorism.  Interestingly, they presuppose a 
designation process, but do not detail how such a process should be structured, do not 
“require the creation of an official list of state sponsors of terrorism, nor define either 
sponsorship or terrorism.”74  While the State Department maintained a list of designated 
state sponsors of terrorism since 1979 per EAA, in 1987 Congress mandated that the 
Secretary of State annually report on the status of the list.  The law required, among other 
things, “assessments with respect to each foreign country…about which the Congress 
was notified during the preceding five years pursuant to [EAA Section 6(j)].”75  The State 
Department had already been producing an annual report called Patterns of Global 
Terrorism since 1983 that essentially fulfilled this function.  The 1987 law simply made 
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the report an annual requirement for the State Department.76  In 2004, the title of the 
report was changed to Country Reports on Terrorism.   
Following the first World Trade Center attack in 1993, Congress sought to 
strengthen anti-terrorism measures and further curtail their potential state sponsors.  In 
1996, the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) was passed, adding a 
host of measures and counter-terrorism amendments to existing laws.  Specifically 
targeting state sponsors, the act “makes it a crime for individuals to engage in financial 
transactions with countries on the [State Sponsors of Terrorism] list,” and “requires the 
U.S. to withhold FAA assistance even from countries that give foreign aid, loans, or 
subsidies to countries on the list.”77  Furthermore, U.S. representatives to international 
financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, are 
legally bound to oppose any financial assistance to designated state sponsors.78 
The AEDPA also amends the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976.  
Specifically, AEDPA vacates immunity for countries designated as state sponsors of 
terrorism in cases “in which money damages are sought...for personal injury or death that 
was caused by an act of torture, extra-judicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or 
the provision of material support of resources for such an act.”79  The change allows 
victims of terrorism to sue a state sponsor in U.S. federal court.  Before the statute was 
passed, sovereign states enjoyed immunity from lawsuits arising from public actions. 
After 9/11, Congress acted quickly to combat terrorism on U.S. soil.  The Uniting 
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) not only provided considerably more 
powers to law enforcement agencies, but also targeted citizens from designated state 
sponsors of terror.  Specifically, the statute “makes it a crime for any ‘restricted person’ 
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to transport or receive any biological toxin.”80  The attempt to restrict access to biological 
agents may be well founded, but how the attempt was implemented is questionable.  “The 
statutory definition of ‘restricted persons’ includes only persons convicted for serious 
crimes, fugitives of justice,..., and aliens from countries on the terrorism list.”81  The act 
effectively equates all citizens of countries designated as sponsors of terrorism to 
criminals.  Even more consequential, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Act 
of 2002 “imposes controls on issuance of visas to non-immigrants from countries that are 
designated as state sponsors of terrorism.”82  Waivers for these controls can only be lifted 
if the Secretary of State, “in consultation with the Attorney General, makes a specific 
finding that the alien does not pose a threat to national security.”83  These two statutes 
represent a fundamental change in how Congress sought to deter sponsors of terrorism.  
Before 9/11, state governments were the target of the legislation, with the idea being that 
economic sanctions could make the costs of sponsoring terrorism too high.  After 9/11, 
Congress began a trend of directly punishing the citizens of countries on the state 
sponsors of terrorism list in the name of protecting U.S. borders. 
B.  MILITARY RESPONSES TO STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM 
While economic sanctions were frequently used to curtail state sponsors of 
terrorism, they were not the only available option.  Presidents occasionally opted for 
military strikes against state sponsors, not only as a punitive measure, but as a message to 
other potential sponsors as well.  These instances were always in response to specific 
attacks.  For example, Operation El Dorado Canyon in 1986 was President Reagan’s 
response to Libyan ties to a bombing at a Berlin nightclub frequented by American 
servicemen.84  A decade later, President Clinton responded to the U.S. embassy 
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bombings in Tanzania and Kenya with Operation Infinite Reach, resulting in dozens of 
cruise missiles being launched against targets in Sudan and Afghanistan.85   
Unilateral military action by the U.S. has had mixed results at best.  In the case of 
the Libyan raid, there was tremendous criticism from the international community.  
Indeed Spain, Italy, and France denied the use of their airspace for the attack.  After the 
raid, the United Nations General Assembly condemned the action.86  Moreover, the raid 
itself did little to stem Libya’s sponsorship activities.  Two years later, Libya would play 
a leading role in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, which resulted in 271 deaths.  
Similarly, in the case of Infinite Reach, cruise missiles destroyed a pharmaceutical plant 
in Sudan that was allegedly preparing WMD for use by al Qaeda.  Multiple terrorist 
training camps in Afghanistan were also targeted.  However, when the intelligence 
justifying the attacks came under scrutiny, serious doubts were raised as to its validity.  
Indeed, there was a public outcry by human rights advocates in the U.S.  Not only was 
one person killed and ten others were injured in the attack on the pharmaceutical plant, 
but it was in fact one of the largest pharmaceutical manufacturers in the country, 
producing treatments for malaria, tuberculosis, and various other ailments common in the 
region.87  Condemnation also came from several allies.88  Moreover, there is strong 
evidence that the missile strikes actually improved the strained relations between Mullah 
Omar and Osama bin Laden.89 
C. WEAKNESSES OF THE CURRENT U.S. POLICY 
The laws governing the State Sponsors of Terrorism list mandate a strict set of 
economic sanctions and hold state governments liable for damages stemming from 
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sponsorship.  It is important to note that the laws were incrementally put in place in 
response to escalating events over the previous two decades.  Today, the hands of U.S. 
foreign policymakers are effectively tied.  Formal designation as a sponsor of terrorism 
results in all of the sanctions being levied against the offending country.  There is no 
room for tailoring specific sanctions to a state sponsor based on the level or type of 
support it provides to terrorists.  The country that offers only financial support to the 
terrorist organization is treated the same as the one that supplies high-tech weapons.  
Moreover, the state that gives tacit support, such as allowing the organization to fundraise 
within its borders, must be treated the same as the one that actively finances operations.  
U.S. foreign policy is inflexible and policymakers are forced to carefully consider all of 
the ramifications before designating a state as a sponsor of terrorism. 
The problems with the current U.S. laws against state-sponsored terrorism go 
beyond inflexibility.  Primarily, there exists an issue regarding the separation of powers.  
As described earlier, FSIA was first enacted to remove the executive branch from the 
determination of jurisdiction within federal courts.  However, AEDPA effectively injects 
the Executive back into the process.  Now, it is the State Department’s designation that 
determines “who may be sued in federal courts, not by the attesting of diplomatic facts 
that define a country’s legally recognized status, but by the parsing of countries for 
political reasons otherwise unrelated to their standing before a court of law.”90  
Following from the first problem, the second issue is one of inconsistency.  From 
the state’s perspective, designation on the State Department’s list of state sponsors opens 
the country to extensive liability.  While the states should be held accountable for their 
actions, a significant temptation exists for victims and their lawyers “to search for any 
conceivable connection to one of the designated states.”91  This temptation is encouraged 
by the possibility of judgments in the million-dollar range and “the fact that virtually all 
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of these states fail to offer defenses.”92  The result is incredulous claims that only need 
“satisfactory” evidence to obtain a default judgment.93  
At the same time, victims of attacks that can be traced back to a state sponsor also 
face uneven treatment.  Unless the state perpetrating the attack is on the State 
Department’s list, that country continues to enjoy immunity.  Therefore, a state may 
actively support terrorist organizations that kill Americans, but not be on the list for 
diplomatic reasons, and thus not subject to the AEDPA waiver of immunity.  For 
example, victims of 9/11 cannot sue the Taliban in federal court because Afghanistan was 
never added to the list of state sponsors.  The Clinton administration took this decision 
deliberately during the late 1990s to avoid acknowledging the Taliban as a ruling power 
over a sovereign state.94    Similarly, depending on when the state was added to the list, 
“the FSIA exception can also discriminate among victims of the same terrorist state.”95   
For example, Iraq, which was one of the first states listed by the State Department in 
1979, was removed in 1982, and then placed back on the list in 1990.  Victims of Iraqi-
sponsored terror during the interim period would not have standing in federal court, 
whereas victims before and after have standing and have employed it in multi-million 
dollar judgments.96 
Finally, as the above example regarding Iraq suggests, there is an ever-present 
problem of inclusion to the list being tied to political considerations that have little 
relevance to a state’s sponsorship practices.  In the case of Iraq, for example, there is no 
evidence Saddam Hussein had ceased supporting terrorist organizations from 1982 to 
1990.  Rather, Iraq’s removal from the list coincides with the height of the Iran-Iraq War.  
When the Shah was removed from power and the Khomeini regime demonstrated anti-
Western tendencies, the U.S. found a new Middle Eastern ally in Iraq.  Removal from the 
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list facilitated easier transactions of dual-use technology and, more importantly, advanced 
weapons.  Once this marriage of convenience had ended, Iraq was placed back on the list 
and military support ceased.  
The above examination of the law governing the state sponsors of terrorism list 
exposes its fundamental flaws.  Reviewing the current list of state sponsors identifies 
further weakness within U.S. law and its negative effects on foreign policy.  At the same 
time, a survey of the list provides insights into the decision calculus of the policymakers 
as well as an opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. policy towards state 
sponsors of terrorism.    
D. IRAN 
Iran was added to the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism in 
January 1984 because of its ties to Hizballah and the attack on the Marine barracks in 
Beirut the previous year.  The addition of Iran to the list essentially amounted to a 
formality for the Reagan administration after all other punitive options were considered 
unfeasible.  Indeed, the attack on the barracks was immediately followed by a flurry of 
U.S. military contingency plans to strike terrorist facilities in Lebanon and Syria.  
However, concerns over potential losses incurred during the strike and endless debates on 
the appropriate target precluded any retaliatory strike from taking place.97  In the end, the 
only definitive action taken by President Reagan was to add Iran to the state sponsors of 
terrorism list.  “It was a meaningless action:  Jimmy Carter had instituted an arms 
embargo against Iran in 1979 which had never been lifted.”98       
There is little doubt Iran belongs on the State Department’s list.  Since the 
country’s Islamic Revolution in 1979, the extensive links between Iran and multiple 
notorious terrorist organizations, such as Hizballah and HAMAS, have been consistently 
proven.  In fact, the 2009 Country Reports on Terrorism names Iran as the “most active 
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state sponsor of terrorism.”99  Indeed, of the 37 designated Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations documented in a 2004 CRS report, Iran provided some form of support to 
seven of them.100   
However, U.S. policy toward Iran is plagued by inconsistency.  The 241 victims 
of the 1983 Marine barracks bombing and their families have no standing in federal 
court.  At the time of the attack, Iran was not on the State Department’s list and therefore 
not subject to exemption from immunity.  In contrast, victims of suicide bombers after 
1984 who were trained by Hizballah and most likely financed by Iran are able to file suit 
and have done so, garnering multi-million dollar judgments.101   
Another problem with Iran’s placement on the list is that it seems to have had 
little effect on the country’s support for terrorism.  Indeed, placing Iran on the list has 
done little to curtail Iran’s or its proxy’s actions.  Less than a year after Iran was added to 
the list, Hizballah detonated a truck bomb at the recently re-opened U.S. embassy in 
Beirut.  Two U.S. military officers and 12 Lebanese were killed.  Satellite imagery would 
later reveal a mock-up of the Embassy’s barricade system at a military facility controlled 
by Hizballah and the IRGC.102  The violence would continue through the coming decades 
and continues to pose multiple problems for U.S. policymakers.  Not only have attacks on 
U.S. personnel and facilities continued, Iranian support of terrorism has proven 
detrimental to the Arab-Israeli Peace Process. 
1. The New Typology:  Iran and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad  
Iran’s support for terrorism is not limited to Hizballah.  Nor are its benefactors 
solely of Shi’a persuasion.  The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) provides the eminent 
example.  Founded in the 1970s, PIJ was unique among the other Palestinian nationalist 
groups.  Despite its Sunni roots, the group “drew inspiration from the success of the 
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Islamic revolution in Iran, and regarded it as a model for emulation.”103  After the Iran-
Iraq war ended in stalemate in 1988, Iran took up the Palestinian cause as a means of 
solidifying its role as a champion of the Arab people.104  Backing Palestinian Islamic 
entities such as PIJ and HAMAS provided Iran with the means to demonstrate its resolve 
to the Arab World.  Adopting the Iranian “perception of Jihad as established by 
Khomeini and the suicide attacks as one of the prominent symbols of Shiite activism,” 
PIJ quickly developed close ties with the Islamic regime and became one of Iran’s 
leading beneficiaries.105 
Applying the proposed typology to the relationship between Iran and PIJ yields 
predictable results.  The forms of sponsorship Iran provides to the terrorist organization 
readily fall into three of the four categories of the proposed typology: logistics, financing, 
and government services.  In an interview with the New York Times in 1993, PIJ’s leader 
noted that the organization had been receiving financial backing and military equipment 
from Iran for years.106  His assertion is supported by an intelligence report released by 
the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  The report documents the transfer of millions of 
dollars to Palestinian terrorist organizations through Syrian banks.  It goes on to explain 
how critical the money transfers are to the operational capabilities of the PIJ because, 
“contrary to the HAMAS or Fatah, [PIJ] does not have deep roots among the Palestinian 
population.”107  Furthermore, the report traces multiple weapons shipments from Iran 
through Syria on its way to Hizballah training camps in Lebanon.  In turn, Hizballah 
provided the weapons and necessary training to Palestinian radicals from multiple 
organizations, to include PIJ.  The weapons training and complementary ideological 
instruction received at these camps fall into the government services category of the 
proposed typology. 
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The considerable support provided by Iran to PIJ along with the close ties 
between the two entities categorizes the relationship as “Sponsorship” within the 
typology presented in Chapter I.  Some might assert that the significant material support 
Iran provides the Palestinian Islamic organizations offers Iran considerable power over 
their actions.  However, in the case of the PIJ, the Sunni/Shi’a divide prevents Iran from 
asserting too much control.  Despite nearly identical motivations, the differing religious 
ideologies would likely cause the group to reject direct orders from Iranian officials or 
splinter if some of the PIJ leadership accepted absolute Iranian control.  Evidence of this 
notion comes from a Washington think tank report that detailed an agreement between 
Iran and PIJ “whereby PIJ would receive a bonus payment for each terrorist attack 
launched against Israel.”108  If Iran had the capability of simply ordering further attacks 
by the PIJ, it would not be necessary to pay for them. 
Since Iran’s support for terrorism is extensive, the mechanisms required to curb 
this support must be equally extensive.  In addition, Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism will 
require the cooperation of other countries if it is to succeed.  The proposed typology 
offers U.S. policymakers an avenue to qualitatively depict Iran’s support for terrorist 
organizations and their violent results.  Furthermore, by establishing a graduated response 
that employs all forms of U.S. power, policymakers will be better equipped to target the 
specific forms of support Iran provides to each of the terrorist organizations.   
E. SYRIA 
Syria’s ties to terrorism also go back decades.  After coming into power in the 
mid-1960s, the Ba’ath party actively began supporting the Palestinian insurgency in 
Israel.109  One of the tenets of Ba’athist ideology is that Israel is not only “an imperialist 
creation but also is an expansionist state seeking to dominate the region.”110  After 
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ascending to the presidency in 1971, Hafiz al-Asad eliminated many of the extremist 
elements of the party in order to solidify his power.  At the same time, al-Asad was a 
pragmatist who saw an opportunity to improve Syria’s position in the Arab world by 
exploiting the Palestinian cause.111  Indeed, he frequently used the Palestinian cause to 
bolster his position as a champion for Arab nationalism.  As such, support for the militant 
Palestinian organizations continued.112  The relationship between Syria and Fatah would 
become so close, the organization announced, “The Pan Arab and national character of 
the Syrian regime...ensures preservation of close ties between Syria and the Palestinian 
Resistance.  Syria is the chief active partner in the Arab struggle against the Zionist 
enemy.”113 
The Nixon and Carter administrations, seeing Syria as a key component in the 
Arab-Israeli peace process, actively worked with al-Asad to stabilize the Middle East.114  
However, relations between the U.S and Syria rapidly cooled once Syria was added to the 
state sponsors of terrorism list in 1979 and the mandated economic sanctions took effect.  
From the U.S. perspective, Syrian support for Palestinian terror was so extensive; 
inclusion on the list was essentially automatic.  The economic gains Syria enjoyed in the 
1970s vanished during the 1980s and the country soon found itself in dire straits.115  In 
spite of this turn of events, support for the militant Palestinian organizations continued.  
Al-Asad determined the state’s need to maintain its identity as the champion for Arab 
nationalism outweighed economic concerns. 
While U.S. sanctions continued to weaken Syria’s economy, Egypt, historically 
Syria’s strongest supporter was becoming more moderate.  Al-Asad realized a new 
partner would be necessary to reinforce his country’s position in the Middle East.  
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Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Hafiz found this new partner in Iran.  
Ayatollah Khomeini rapidly provided economic support and military equipment to the 
Palestinians in Lebanon with the assistance of Syria.116  In effect, Syria’s inclusion to the 
list, along with the military actions of Israel, drove Syria to deepen its relationship with 
Palestinian terrorist organizations and into the arms of the U.S.’s principal opponent in 
the Middle East.  
The weakness of current U.S. policy as dictated by law is the disparity between 
how Syria is treated as opposed to Iran.  Syria has provided support to multiple terrorist 
organizations over the years, but has primarily benefited Palestinian terrorist groups, 
including HAMAS, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC), and PIJ.  Despite 
the well-documented ties to terrorism, diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Syria 
were extensive throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  In fact, a CRS report from 2002 notes 
that “despite its position on the terrorism list, the United States maintains relatively 
normal relations with Syria.  The two countries exchange ambassadors and most forms of 
U.S. non-military trade with and U.S. investment in Syria are permitted.”117  In contrast, 
the U.S. government broke diplomatic ties with Iran in 1980 and today Iranian affairs in 
the U.S. “are represented by the Embassy of Pakistan.”118  Law and presidential action 
prohibit nearly all forms of trade with the country.119   
Ostensibly, the difference between the two states is the shared border between 
Syria, Lebanon, and Israel.  Indeed, every president from Nixon on saw Syria as an 
important actor in the Arab-Israel Peace process.  Furthermore, Syria’s assistance during 
the hijacking and hostage crisis of TWA Flight 847 in 1985 demonstrated the country 
could be an important ally in spite of its ties to Palestinian terrorist organizations.120  
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Therefore, from a diplomatic standpoint it is necessary to make a distinction between Iran 
and Syria.  However, current U.S. law is not flexible enough to allow for such a 
distinction in regards to state sponsors of terrorism.  When policymakers attempt to do so, 
U.S. foreign policy appears hypocritical. 
1. The New Typology:  Syria and HAMAS 
HAMAS, which is “both an acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya 
(Islamic Resistance Movement) and an Arabic word meaning ‘zeal,’” is an extremist 
Palestinian nationalist organization.121  Its founders split from the Islamic Brotherhood in 
1987, taking a significantly more militant role than its parent organization in the Gaza 
Strip.  While the leadership seeks a separate Palestinian state like most Palestinian 
nationalist groups, HAMAS believes this can only be obtained through the demise of 
Israel.122  The organization continues to enjoy support from the Palestinian people, not 
only because of its ongoing attacks on Israel, but also through its extensive public 
education and social welfare programs.123  Indeed, the deep popular support for HAMAS 
was recently demonstrated in the 2006 elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council 
where the organization took 76 of 132 seats.124 
The reasons behind the relationship between Syria and HAMAS are two-fold.  
First, public backing of Palestinian nationalist organizations, such as HAMAS, offers 
Syria a sense of legitimacy amongst Arab states.  As described earlier, from the start of 
the Hafiz al-Asad regime, Pan-Arab nationalism was touted as a cornerstone of the 
establishment.  This policy continues under Bashar al-Asad, who took power in 2000.  
Second, by maintaining close ties to HAMAS, Syria ensures it will not be left out of any 
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settlement between Palestine and Israel.125  Since Syria shares borders with Israel and 
Lebanon, the country has a vested interest in how the Arab-Israeli conflict plays out.  
The primary form of sponsorship provided by Syria to HAMAS is a safe haven.  
The State Department’s Patterns of Terrorism report from 2000 notes HAMAS had 
opened a main office in Damascus in 1999.126  The Bashar al-Asad regime claimed this 
office is “solely used for press purposes and play[s] no leadership or operational role in 
the conduct of terrorist attacks.”127 The U.S. government, while acknowledging that the 
Syrian government prohibits attacks originating from its territory, maintains there is clear 
evidence that the Syrian safe haven is expressly used for operational purposes.  
Specifically, “from Damascus, Hamas’s leadership-in-exile can direct the group’s 
operations through financial transactions and unrestrained access to travel and 
communications.”128  Moreover, the Syrian government allows weapons shipments from 
Iran to terrorist organizations to transit through its ports.  One example occurred in March 
of this year, when Israel intercepted a container ship transporting “50 tons of Iranian 
smuggled weaponry on its way to HAMAS” that originated in the Syrian port city of 
Latakia.129  Israeli intelligence reports note that due to the weak Syrian economy, 
Palestinian organizations receive very little direct financial assistance from the Syrian 
government.130  However, all of the groups operating “media offices” within Damascus 
are allowed to actively fundraise from these offices as well as “use Damascus and the 
Syrian national banking system for money transfers to the [Palestinian Authority] 
areas.”131  
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Even though Syria readily admits its support for HAMAS, which it considers one 
of the “legitimate resistance movements against Israeli occupation,” the forms of support 
it provides and the relationship between the state and its terrorist beneficiaries is 
somewhat unique.132  The assistance provided by the state is essentially indirect in 
nature.  HAMAS and the other organizations are allowed to fundraise and utilize the 
national banking system to receive large amounts of money from Iran, but Syria provides 
little direct funding to the terrorist groups.  Weapons from Iran are permitted to transit 
Syrian territory, but the government does not appear to be the main source of these arms.  
The Syrian government maintains some control of the organization, demonstrated by the 
moratorium on strikes originating from within Syrian territory.  At the same time, Syria 
does not appear to order or assist in specific operations.   
Yet, current State Department policy for state sponsors of terrorism mandates that 
Syria be treated the same as Iran.  In this context, the economic sanctions prescribed by 
law, must be enforced equally against both states.  However, enforcement is problematic 
given the diplomatic requirements of dealing with Syria in the Israeli Peace Process.  
Policymakers lack the flexibility to use economic levers during negotiations.  A 
distinction needs to be made between Syria and Iran and the way they go about 
supporting international terrorism.  This distinction is possible with the proposed 
typology.   
As noted in the 2009 Country Reports on Terrorism, the country is clearly a safe 
haven for the leadership of some of the most violent Palestinian terrorist organizations.  
Furthermore, government services in the form of unrestricted travel across and within its 
borders as well as sanctioning the sizable arms shipments transiting its territory allow 
terrorist organizations within Palestine, Iraq, and Lebanon to thrive.  Therefore, 
according to the proposed typology, the Syria-HAMAS relationship falls within the 
“Sponsorship” category like Iran and PIJ, but to a lesser extent along the spectrum of 
involvement.  This nuance can translate to less extensive economic sanctions, offering 
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policymakers greater flexibility in how to address the state while maintaining the notion 
that Syria continues to sponsor terrorism. 
F. SUDAN 
Sudan’s ties to terrorism date back to the military coup of 1989 led by General 
Umar al-Bashir that brought the National Islamic Front (NIF) to power.  The party’s 
leader, Hassan al-Turabi, sought to establish an Islamist state in Sudan and offered 
sanctuary for Islamic extremist groups from around the world in the early 1990s.  The 
Islamist groups, such as the ANO, Gama’a al-Islamiyya, HAMAS, and most significantly 
al Qaeda (AQ), rapidly established sizable operations within the country to include 
extensive training networks.   
However, in the mid- to late-1990s, Sudan began to suffer for its relationship with 
these organizations.  Actions taken by the terrorist groups severely tarnished the 
country’s image overseas.  Attempting to take a harder stance on Sudan than previous 
administrations, President Clinton ordered that Sudan be added to the state sponsors of 
terrorism list in August of 1993.133  The explanation of the State Department’s update to 
the list stated that despite warnings, “the Sudanese Government continued to harbor 
international terrorist groups” and “maintained a disturbing relationship with a wide 
range of Islamic extremists.”134  Sudan quickly felt the economic impact of inclusion on 
the list as “the big Western oil firms who, it was hoped, would pour money into the 
country’s infrastructure” reconsidered investing in Sudan.135   
Attempting to repair its international image, Sudan began taking measures to curb 
its support for international terrorism.  In 1994, the notorious international terrorist 
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known as Carlos (Illich Ramirez Sanchez) was surrendered to France.136  His extradition 
allowed Sudan to offer proof of its claim that it did not support terror.137  At the same 
time, since Carlos was not identified with Islamic terror, the Sudanese government would 
not offend the Islamist organizations that were beneficial to the country’s interests.  
However, international pressure to end all of Sudan’s ties to terrorism reached a zenith in 
1995.  An assassination attempt on Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak while he was 
attending a conference in Ethiopia was tied to organizations based out of Sudan.  
Investigations confirmed, “that the assassins apparently had arrived in Ethiopia from 
Sudan, and some had fled back there after the assassination attempt.”138  Under 
increasing pressure from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Western powers, Sudanese 
intelligence officials requested the country’s extremist guests, to include al Qaeda, to 
leave the country.139  It is important to note that the expulsion occurred not because of 
U.S. sanctions, but was the result of multi-lateral pressure that included one of Sudan’s 
neighbors. 
However, support for some terrorist organizations, primarily those of Palestinian 
nationalist origin like HAMAS and PIJ, continued through the second half of the decade.  
It was not until President Bashir overcame al-Turabi in an extended power struggle that 
effectively ended in 2001 that significant strides were made to curtail the terrorist groups 
within the country.  Indeed, a CRS report notes that since then U.S. counter-terrorism 
teams have visited the country and continue to monitor Sudan’s actions.  Furthermore, 
the 2003 Country Reports on Terrorism notes Sudan “deepened its cooperation with the 
U.S. Government to investigate and apprehend extremists suspected of involvement in 
terrorist activities.”140  
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Nonetheless, Sudan’s international troubles continue, not because of terrorism, 
but rather due to the crisis in Darfur and other internal struggles.  Recent Obama 
administration statements have effectively tied the country’s removal from the State 
Department’s list of state sponsors to the resolution of these domestic issues.141  Indeed, 
the 2009 Country Reports on Terrorism notes continued cooperation in anti-terrorism 
operations, but then dedicates a lengthy paragraph to discussing operations in the 
country’s civil war.142  Linking inclusion on the list of state sponsors to extraneous 
political issues calls the true purpose of the list into question.  Continuing to label a state 
as a sponsor of terrorism in order to coerce actions unrelated to terrorism confuses the 
international community on U.S. policy and further complicates the issue of state 
sponsorship of international terrorism.     
1. The New Typology:  Sudan and Al Qaeda 
Al-Turabi sought out Usama bin Laden and invited him to Sudan’s capital, 
Khartoum, in 1990.143  Bin Laden, who at the time was under a form of house arrest in 
Jeddah, accepted al-Turabi’s invitation and fled to Sudan in an act of subterfuge.  After 
arriving, bin Laden invested large amounts of money in Khartoum infrastructure as well 
as putting “up the funds for the twenty-three new training camps for militants and 
government militia that [al-Turabi] wanted to build.”144  In addition, bin Laden fostered 
ties to the myriad other groups that had established operations within the country, 
including the Islamic Jihad group led by Ayman al-Zawahiri.145  
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Differing ideologies and the growing costs of hosting AQ and the other terrorist 
organizations eventually made Sudan’s guests too much of a liability.146  Indeed, the 
Sudanese government went as far as to make informal approaches regarding its terrorist 
guests to the U.S. State Department.  However, the U.S. demanded “access to training 
camps and the provision of details about various individuals,” but there was “no explicit 
demand that bin Laden be handed over.”147  Ostensibly, this is because he had not yet 
been formally indicted and as such, “there [were] no grounds to hold him in the USA.”148  
Bin Laden and the bulk of his organization moved to Afghanistan in 1996. 
The 2009 Country Reports, explaining Sudan’s continued presence on the list of 
state sponsors, notes that elements of AQ, as well as PIJ and HAMAS, still exist within 
the country.  However, the rest of the report on Sudan implies the country continues to 
make inroads against AQ.149  In contrast, the report notes that the Sudanese government 
considers HAMAS “freedom fighters” and has welcomed its members as representatives 
of the Palestinian Authority, allowing the organization to fundraise from its office in 
Khartoum.   
Examining the Sudan/AQ relationship from the perspective of the proposed 
typology, the country is not a sponsor of the terrorist organization.  Indeed, Sudan does 
not assist AQ and does not tolerate it operating within the country’s borders.150  
Obviously, U.S. policymakers must also consider the Sudanese government’s relationship 
with HAMAS.  By offering the Palestinian organization political support and a safe 
haven from which to fundraise likely places Sudan in the “Toleration” category.   
The State Department’s designation of Sudan raises two problems.  First, the 
Sudanese government has made significant attempts at restitution for its ties to terrorism, 
attempts that Syria and Iran have never made.  Yet, the country continues to be punished 
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to the same extent as the two most active sponsors of terrorism.  Second, the U.S. State 
Department and the President have made it clear Sudan’s designation as a state sponsor 
of terrorism will be removed once it expels the Palestinian terrorist organizations and 
assists in efforts to resolve the situation in Darfur and South Sudan.151  The designation 
as a state sponsor is being utilized as a diplomatic “carrot and stick” rather than a tool to 
identify states that employ terrorist organizations.  The new typology prevents this from 
happening by being very specific about the level of involvement and prescribing 
graduated levels of response based on that level.  In the case of Sudan, its relationship 
with al Qaeda no longer warrants designation as a state sponsor.  However, policymakers 
would have to examine the country’s relationship with other terrorist organizations as 
well. 
G. CUBA AND THE COLOMBIAN NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY 
The links between Cuba and international terrorism today are tenuous at best.  
Cuba first appeared on the state sponsors of terrorism list in 1982.  When the Reagan 
administration ordered its addition, no clear explanation of why was immediately offered.  
However, in his State of the Union Address in January of that year, the president stated, 
“Toward those who would export terrorism and subversion in the Caribbean and 
elsewhere, especially Cuba and Libya, we will act with firmness.”152  In the subsequent 
issue of the State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism, it was noted, “the Soviet 
Union and Cuba appear to be pursuing a long-term coordinated campaign to establish 
sympathetic Latin American regimes.  Part of their strategy involves nurturing 
organizations and groups that use terrorism in support of their efforts to undermine 
existing regimes.”153  Indeed, during the 1980s there was a very real fear of a Soviet 
influence in the Western hemisphere, perpetuated by Castro’s Cuba.  However, since the 
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country was already subject to economic sanctions dating back to the 1960s, the 
country’s inclusion on the list had no significant effect on U.S. policy or Cuban response. 
More recently, a CRS report from January of 2010 notes, “in 1992, Fidel Castro 
said that his country’s support for insurgents abroad was a thing of the past.”154  His 
assertion is supported by the State Department’s 2009 Country Reports on Terrorism, 
which states, “Cuba no longer supports armed struggle in Latin America and other parts 
of the world.”155  The report goes on to say in spite of this fact, the country remains on 
the list because “the Government of Cuba continued to provide physical safe haven and 
ideological support to members of three terrorist organizations that are designated as 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the United States.”156   
One of the organizations noted by the State Department is the National Liberation 
Army of Colombia (ELN).  Inspired by communist intellectuals such as Che Guerva in 
the 1960s, Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries in rural Colombia formed ELN.157  Support 
from Cuba to ELN, as well as other Colombian leftist organizations, was primarily 
political and ideological with occasional logistical and financial assistance.158  Following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the assistance provided to the revolutionaries all but 
ceased, due in large part to Cuba’s growing economic problems.159  The State 
Department’s chief complaint levied against Cuba in the Country Reports for the last five 
years is the safe haven of ELN members.  However, the 2002 and 2003 Country Reports 
noted that Colombia “acquiesced to this arrangement and that Colombia publicly said that 
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it wanted Cuba’s continued mediation with ELN in Cuba.”160  In fact, the State 
Department has praised Cuba’s role in the ongoing peace negotiations.161 
Examining the Cuba-ELN relationship through the proposed typology makes the 
case for a very different assessment than that of the State Department.  While Cuba’s 
support for insurgencies during the 1980s throughout the Caribbean and Latin America 
was extensive, by the State Department’s own words Cuba’s involvement today is limited 
to the safe haven of a few members.  At the same time, the State Department has 
acknowledged Cuba’s role in the Colombian peace process and Bogota’s consent for 
ELN members to stay in Cuba.  The U.S. attempts to bolster its argument for including 
Cuba on the list by noting that the country continues to harbor several fugitives, including 
convicted hijackers.  However, these hijackers are no longer threats to the U.S.  As such, 
Cuba does not honestly fall in the spectrum of involvement.  Even if one considers the 
members of the other terrorist organizations harbored by Cuba, then the state might fall 
along the spectrum at the weakest sense of “Toleration,” but even that is debatable. 
Cuba is the strongest example of the need for a more nuanced approach to the US 
policy of state-sponsored terrorism.  The evidence for keeping the country on the list is 
exceptionally weak.  Cuba is economically unable to rise to the same level of sponsorship 
as Syria or Iran.  It simply does not have the means now or in the near future.  
Furthermore, removing countries such as Libya and North Korea from the list only adds 
fuel to critics of US policy and its hypocrisy. 
H.  CONCLUSION 
Current U.S. policy toward state-sponsored terrorism finds its roots in U.S. law, 
which is a strength as well as a weakness.  Formally identifying countries that allow 
terrorism to thrive is an important step toward curtailing its use.  However, current U.S. 
law codifies a wide-range of specific actions to deal with state sponsors.  Mandating a list 
of sanctions is convenient, but comes at the cost limiting options for policymakers.  
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Today policymakers must carefully consider all of the ramifications before including a 
state on the list or risk alienating an essential ally.  Evidence of the inflexibility of U.S. 
policy can be found by examining the current list of state sponsors.  Cuba remains on the 
State Department’s list of state sponsors despite foregoing sponsorship almost two 
decades ago.  At the same time, Pakistan, a frequently cited ally in the war on terror, is 
actually a well-known sponsor of terrorist groups operating in Kashmir.  But designating 
the country as such would likely mean critical support for our operations in Afghanistan 
coming to an end.  Applying the typology presented in Chapter I to states currently on the 
list presents the potential benefits of a more nuanced approach that recognizes the fact 
that there are gradations of state support.   
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III. COUNTRIES NOT ON THE STATE DEPARTMENT’S LIST 
OF STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM 
The previous chapter surveyed the State Department’s current list of state 
sponsors and specifically identified the faults within current policy.  However, the 
shortcomings of U.S. foreign policy extend to countries that are not on the list of state 
sponsors.  This chapter begins by examining two countries that were removed from the 
list in the last decade, Libya and North Korea.  Specifically, the chapter examines the 
process leading to their removal.  Presenting these cases demonstrates the problems with 
current U.S. policy in the context of a state that has demonstrated it has “graduated” from 
the designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.  In addition, three other countries that 
have never been on the list will be examined.  Recently, members of Congress have 
called for Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and Pakistan to be added to the list of state sponsors.  
This chapter will examine the reasoning behind these requests and discuss how the 
typology presented in Chapter I offers those wishing to label these countries as state 
sponsors an opportunity to do so without completely alienating the offending state. 
A. LIBYA 
Like Syria, Libya’s extensive involvement with terrorism made the country’s 
inclusion automatic when the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism was 
created in 1979.  As noted in Chapter I, Libya was involved with several infamous 
terrorist organizations throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, to include PIRA, ANO, 
PIJ, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command.  Indeed, 
Qaddafi’s foreign policy became intimately linked to international terrorism as soon as he 
came to power in 1969.162  Having overthrown a monarchy, Qaddafi brought with him a 
revolutionary ideology steeped in Arab nationalism.  This Pan-Arab ideology drove many 
of his early actions, such as the termination of military base agreements with the U.S. and 
U.K. and his broad support for a variety of Palestinian groups, both violent and non-
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violent.163  By 1979, U.S.-Libya relations had deteriorated beyond repair, leading to the 
trashing of the U.S. embassy in Libya and its subsequent closure the following year.164 
Seeking a stronger stance on terrorism than previous administrations, President 
Reagan took a hard line towards the Libyan leader.  Evidence suggests that Reagan saw 
the Libyan regime as a target for demonstrating U.S. resolve against the Soviet Union and 
its proxies.165  For his part, Qaddafi obliged Reagan by nationalizing American oil 
interests within the country and overtly sponsoring not only Palestinian terrorist 
organizations, but also groups that targeted U.S. interests.  However, “the overwhelming 
majority of the European partners…refused to support a confrontational approach to 
Libya.”166  While most of our European allies saw Qaddafi as nuisance, they doubted he 
was a proxy for the Soviet Union.167  Moreover, Qaddafi’s nationalist aspirations were 
generally “greeted with widespread disbelief and disinterest throughout the Arab and 
African worlds,” which “effectively confined him to the Libyan playhouse.”168     
Tensions between the U.S. and Libya continued to heat up throughout the 1980s, 
reaching a zenith in 1986.  The administration had been plagued by international terrorist 
attacks up to that point and President Reagan sought to make an example of the next 
perpetrator.  It was at that point that the LaBelle discotheque was bombed.169  “General 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Britain’s counterpart to the National Security 
Agency, had intercepted a message to Tripoli from the People’s Bureau in East Berlin 
predicting ‘a joyous event’” before the bombing and another message reporting the 
operation was a success immediately after.170  Based on these intercepted messages, 
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which were equated to a “smoking gun,” Reagan ordered Operation El Dorado Canyon, 
as discussed in Chapter II.171  However, the raid had the opposite of its desired effect in 
that “Qaddafi emerged as the victim of American bullying and hegemonic power.”172  
Furthermore, when intelligence later appeared which indicated Syrian government 
involvement, but no retaliation against Syria was forthcoming, the U.S. once again 
appeared to be applying a double standard.173   
The George H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations would continue the hard line 
toward Libya and its leader.  However, the Clinton administration would have the 
opportunity to employ a multi-lateral approach in an effort to coerce Qaddafi.  Libya’s 
connection to the Lockerbie bombing would serve as the catalyst for United Nations 
(U.N.) sponsored sanctions against the country.  Up to this point, the U.S. had employed 
the unilateral sanctions mandated by Libya’s inclusion on the State Department’s list of 
state sponsors.  Other countries, including U.S. allies, had little interest in employing 
similar actions against Libya.  However, in 1993 a resolution passed by the U.N. Security 
Council made a multilateral solution possible.  The resolution directed a series of 
economic sanctions against the Libyan regime for not surrendering two suspects in the 
Pan Am 103 bombing to the U.S. or U.K. for trial.  Even though the sanctions directed by 
the resolution were not as extensive as the U.S. had desired, they “hit Qaddafi where it 
hurt.”174  Recognizing the warning signs, Qaddafi directed his associates to attempt to re-
establish communications with the U.S in 1992.  At that point, however, the U.S. was not 
interested in negotiations with the rogue regime.175   
Six years later, Libyan officials would once again attempt to reopen 
communications with the U.S.  This time, the U.N. member states were beginning to 
                                                 
171 Ibid., 286. 
172 Zoubir, "Libya in U.S. Foreign Policy," 33. 
173 Davis, Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya, 116–18.  
174 Zoubir, "Libya in U.S. Foreign Policy," 35. 
175 Ronald Bruce St. John, "'Libya Is Not Iraq': Preemptive Strikes, Wmd and Diplomacy," Middle 
East Journal 58, no. 3 (2004): 388–89. 
 50 
experience “sanction fatigue.”176  The U.S., fearing U.N. support for multilateral 
sanctions was beginning to wane, offered Libya a third country option for the trial of the 
two suspects of the Pan Am bombing.  Qaddafi agreed to this approach in 1999.  Later 
that same year, in a hearing before Congress, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ronald 
E. Neumann noted Libya had taken “important steps against terrorism: expulsion of Abu 
Nidal, closing of Abu Nidal’s training camps, visa restrictions to prevent entry of 
terrorists to Libya, opposition to Islamist extremists, and switching to Yasser Arafat 
against Palestinian rejections.”177  It appeared Libya had reached a turning point. 
Yet, Libya would remain on the list of state sponsors of terrorism until 2006.  
Indeed, Libya’s removal from the list would be the very last step taken by the U.S. to 
normalize relations between the two countries.  The Patterns of Global Terrorism from 
1999 until 2005 noted Libya’s continued progression in terminating its relationships with 
terrorist organizations and its compliance with U.S. demands.  However, the George W. 
Bush administration linked Libya’s removal from the list to demands unrelated to 
terrorism, specifically the country’s WMD and ballistic missile programs and human 
rights issues within the country.178 Once again, U.S. foreign policy conflated disparate 
issues, making the U.S. appear hypocritical in the eyes of the international community, 
particularly given international views on Guantanamo and other human rights aspects of 
the war on terror. 
1. The New Typology: Libya and ANO 
Examining the relationship between Libya and one of its principal beneficiaries 
through the proposed typology provides evidence of its efficacy over current U.S. policy.  
The Abu Nidal Organization, named after the nom de guerre of its leader, was one of 
several splinter groups of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.  However, what began 
as an activist Palestinian nationalist group became one of the most feared terrorist 
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organizations during the 1980s.  ANO was renowned not only for its ruthlessness but also 
for its rapidly changing loyalty.  Between 1974 and 1999, ANO would exploit and be 
expelled from three state sponsors: Iraq, Syria, and Libya. 
After expulsion from Syria in 1986, ANO established a new base of operations in 
Libya.  One author notes the relationship between Qaddafi and Abu Nidal, though 
strained at times, would eventually flourish because of a common “neurotic suspicion, 
[and] inferiority complex.”179  While in Libya, ANO worked to eliminate Libyan 
expatriate dissidents in Europe for Qaddafi while also assassinating enemies of Abu 
Nidal.  Most notably, it was during this time ANO assassinated Abu al-Hol and Abu 
‘Yad, Fatah’s chiefs of security and intelligence respectively.  The close relationship 
between Qaddafi and Abu Nidal and the resources provided by Libya place the country in 
the “Sponsor” category of the proposed typology. 
In 1994, however, Libya’s support to ANO abruptly ended.  Qaddafi actively 
sought to establish communications with the West, primarily the United States.  
Associations with organizations such as ANO had to be terminated before a dialogue 
could even begin.  After being expelled once again, Abu Nidal would return to Iraq, only 
to die there of gunshot wounds in 2002.180  Whether his death was a suicide or an 
assassination is still a matter of debate. 
By cutting Libya’s ties to ANO, Qaddafi demonstrated a willingness to end 
support for terrorist organizations, essentially meeting the first condition of being 
removed from the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism.  However, after 
Qaddafi had expelled Abu Nidal, U.S. policymakers, primarily the president, changed the 
conditions upon which Libya would be removed from the list, eventually requiring 
changes in Libyan policies unrelated to terrorism.  The result was Libya finally being 
removed from the list years after the state had actually cut ties to terrorism as a form of 
foreign policy. 
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The proposed typology offers a better alternative for dealing with dictators like 
Qaddafi.  By taking the initial step of expelling ANO, the State Department had the 
flexibility to downgrade Libya’s status from “Sponsor” to “Supporter.”  Offering 
countries the ability to change their status on the list of state sponsors through meaningful 
demonstrations of policy changes can be a powerful incentive for some regimes.  Indeed, 
Qaddafi actively sought out removal from the State Department’s list.181  The dictator’s 
insistence on intervening in African regional affairs was an example of his desire to 
maintain a “self-image as a charismatic political leader of the developing world.”182  By 
remaining on the list alongside Syria, Iran, and North Korea, Libya remained a pariah 
state rather than one engaged in the international community.  Indications were Qaddafi 
would have quickly complied with terrorism-related demands in order to remove Libya 
from the list of state sponsors.  Rather than a employing systematic approach specifically 
tied to state-sponsored terrorism, the Bush administration linked removal from the list to 
other foreign policy objectives.  This linkage significantly prolonged the normalization 
process. 
B. NORTH KOREA 
North Korea was added to the state sponsors of terrorism list following the 
bombing of Korean Airlines Flight 858 in November 1987.  Two North Korean 
operatives planted a bomb in the passenger cabin during one of the plane’s stopovers.  
The plane exploded over the Andaman Sea killing all 115 passengers and crew on board.  
As authorities closed in on the two operatives in Bahrain, the male committed suicide, but 
the female was stopped before completing the act.  During her interrogation, the female 
operative confessed to the bombing.  She also described the details of the bomb plot, to 
include Kim Jong-Il’s role in signing the order for the attack.183  The purpose of the plot 
was to destabilize the South Korean government as it prepared for the 1988 Olympic 
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Games and “deter visitors from attending by showing a dangerous and volatile 
peninsula.”184 
North Korea would remain on the list for another two decades despite no other 
evidence of involvement in terrorist attacks.  Indeed, the 1996 Patterns of Global 
Terrorism quotes a North Korean spokesperson as stating the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) is opposed to “all kinds of terrorism” and “any assistance to 
it,” a claim repeated following the attacks of 9/11.185  The sanctions mandated by 
inclusion on the list, however, had little impact.  North Korea had been a pariah state 
since the end of the Korean War and, therefore, trade with the U.S. was virtually non-
existent. 
In 2000, the Clinton Administration, seeking to renew negotiations with North 
Korea over its ballistic missile program, invited DPRK officials to Washington, D.C.  
North Korea responded with a list of preconditions to be met before talks could begin, 
one of which was removal from the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism.  
The Clinton Administration answered by citing four stipulations for North Korea’s 
removal: “issue a written guarantee that it no longer is engaged in terrorism, provide 
evidence that it has not engaged in any terrorist act in the past six months, join 
international anti-terrorism agreements, and address issues of past support of 
terrorism.”186  Eventually, North Korea conceded on the issue of coming off the list and 
talks began in October 2000 with the country still designated as a state sponsor. 
The issue of removal came up again in 2003, when the George W. Bush 
Administration sought to start a new round of U.S.-North Korea diplomacy.  During six-
party talks, North Korea demanded removal from the State Department’s list as one of 
several U.S. concessions.  In return, North Korea offered a significant scale-back in its 
nuclear development program.187  At first, the Bush administration flatly refused to 
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discuss any issue regarding U.S.-North Korea relations until “North Korea agreed to and 
took concrete steps to dismantle its nuclear program.”188  However, as pressure mounted 
over the next few years, the U.S. posture during the negotiations changed and matters 
such as Japanese hostages being held in North Korea and the country’s place on the 
sponsors of terrorism list became bargaining chips.  By 2007, North Korea’s removal 
from the State Department’s list was linked to one specific issue of the six-party talks, the 
disablement of the Yongbyon plutonium nuclear facility.189  Despite lingering issues on 
North Korea’s verification and reporting procedures, the country was removed from the 
list of state sponsors in 2008, another example of the state sponsor label being removed 
for reasons other than the country’s counter-terrorism efforts. 
1. The New Typology: North Korea and Hizballah 
Application of the typology proposed in Chapter I, would have allowed for North 
Korea’s removal from the list almost a decade earlier.  Had the North Korean officials 
offered evidence with their 1995 claim disavowing terrorism, North Korea could have 
gone from a “Direct Control” label to completely off the list.  Of course, the willingness 
of the DPRK to provide such evidence is dubious.  Nonetheless, the flexibility of the list 
allows for such action. 
At the same time, the new typology is also flexible enough to allow for rapidly 
placing states on the list, or back on the list in the case of North Korea, once a 
relationship between the state and a terrorist organization has been confirmed.  In March 
2010, a South Korean naval vessel sank “in waters disputed by the two Koreas.”190  A 
subsequent investigation implicated a torpedo launched from a North Korean submarine 
as the cause.  Calls by U.S. and South Korean policymakers to place North Korean back 
on the list of state sponsors soon followed.  A few months later, Israel announced a 
shipment of weapons manufactured by North Korea had been seized in Thailand in 
December 2009.  Israeli intelligence sources confirmed the shipment was intended for 
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Hizballah via Iran.191  Furthermore, there is mounting evidence of the North Korea 
military training Hizballah field commanders and assisting in the building of complex 
underground systems of bunkers in Lebanon.192  However, to date, the State Department 
has not indicated a willingness to place North Korea back on the list.  It seems the U.S. 
has lost the threat of state sponsor label as a negotiating lever when dealing with North 
Korea.193  This is a consequence of linking inclusion on the State Department’s list with 
matters unrelated to terrorism. 
C. SAUDI ARABIA 
Immediately after the identities of the 9/11 hijackers were released, commentators 
were quick to point out that 15 of the 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia.  Moreover, 
Usama bin Laden was also a Saudi national.194  U.S. critics of Saudi Arabia cited these 
facts and demanded foreign policymakers reconsider the longtime bonds with the 
country.  They claimed Saudi Arabia was a hotbed for extremism and a nexus for the 
financing of terrorist organizations.  A sizable portion of Congress would agree.  In 2003, 
“191 members of the House of Representatives supported a bill to add Saudi Arabia to 
the official U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism.”195  The next year, the 9/11 
Commission’s Final Report would document al Qaeda financing and demonstrate that a 
sizable portion came from Saudi charities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  
However, the report would also note that there was “no evidence that the Saudi 
government as an institution or senior Saudi official individually funded the 
organization.”196   
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Despite tensions between U.S. and Saudi government officials and the general 
populace of both countries, Saudi Arabia continued to be major buyer for U.S. military 
equipment in the years following 9/11.  Between 2001 and 2004, Saudi Arabia signed 
$3.8 billion in new arms-transfer agreements from the U.S.197  More importantly, the 
country continued to be the second largest exporter of oil to the U.S.198  As such, 
designating Saudi Arabia as a state sponsor of terrorism makes little economic sense.  
The sanctions accompanying the list would have severe effects on the U.S. economy.  
Policymakers wanting to coerce the Saudi government into tightening controls on 
charities and NGOs would have to find another way.  The proposed typology offers 
exactly that, a way to label Saudi Arabia without the heavy-handed sanctions required by 
law.   
1. The New Typology: Saudi Arabia and AQ 
Evidence of the country’s indirect relationship with AQ, as well as several other 
extremist groups, is extensive.  Saudi funding of jihadi operations goes back to the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s.  During that time, Saudi intelligence services 
actively financed mujahideen fighters and equipment to battle the Soviets.199  Not only 
were government funds used to support the insurgency, but private donations made to 
charities such as “the Muslim World League, and its subsidiaries the International Islamic 
Relief Organisation (IIRO) and the Islamic Relief Agency” were used to support the 
jihad.200  These charities and NGOs would, in fact, support humanitarian needs.  
However, some of the funds would be diverted as necessary for mujahideen equipment 
and supplies.  Usama bin Laden, as well as several other Saudi nationals, helped facilitate 
the flow of funds.201  This experience would help the future leader of AQ to build 
contacts and establish similar organizations that would fund his future operations.   
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In fact, he would have to utilize these skills shortly after arriving in Afghanistan 
in 1996.  According to the 9/11 Commission, when bin Laden was expelled from Sudan, 
the Sudanese government appropriated the businesses he left behind.202  The Saudi 
government had frozen all of bin Laden’s assets connected to his portion of the family 
business two years earlier.203  He returned to Afghanistan completely dependent on his 
Taliban hosts.  However, bin Laden quickly reinvigorated “the Golden Chain,” an 
informal financial network of prominent Saudi and Gulf individuals originally established 
to support the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance movement.204  Much of Saudi Arabia 
adheres to a strict sect of Wahhabism, which extols the virtues of jihad and encourages its 
members to liberally donate to the cause.  “Some individual donors knew, and others did 
not, the ultimate destination of their donations.”205  In either case, bin Laden clearly 
benefitted.  By 1998, multiple terrorist training camps were operating in Afghanistan and 
AQ was able to fund the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.   
After the embassy attacks, U.S. agencies began to trace bin Laden’s funding.  Up 
until that point, “the intelligence community largely accepted the notion that bin Laden 
financed terror out of his own pocket.”206  Months of investigations would eventually 
reveal that “streams of money were circulating out of the Gulf States by way of regional 
banking centers...and then being transferred electronically or carried by hand to Pakistan 
and Afghanistan.  Some Islamic NGOs were acting as conduits to channel money to al-
Qaeda operatives.”207  While the Saudi government did not directly fund bin Laden and 
AQ, the complete lack of regulation and oversight of the charities and NGOs involved 
allowed these transactions to take place.  The complacency of the Saudi Arabian 
government places the country squarely in the “Toleration” category of the typology 
described in Chapter I. 
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After 9/11, it appeared this complacency would continue.  A year after the attacks, 
the Saudi Interior Minister publicly announced “that al Qaeda could not possibly have 
planned an operation of such magnitude,” essentially sending the message the secret 
police under his control would not be tracking down al Qaeda operatives.208  However, 
the Saudi government would eventually comply with a U.N. resolution calling for the 
freezing of assets belonging to known terrorists.  It was not until Saudi Arabia itself was 
attacked in 2003 that the government began to take direct action to stop the financing of 
terrorism.  Most notably, in September of that year members of the Financial Action Task 
Force and the Gulf Cooperation Council visited Saudi Arabia to provide guidance and 
establish practices to curtail the flow of funds to terrorist organizations.209  Saudi Arabia 
continues to make progress on the financing front.  However, a 2009 Government 
Accountability Office report notes that the Saudi government is less committed to 
curtailing money bound for organizations outside its borders.210  Efforts are being made, 
but these efforts did not begin until the attacks in 2003.   
Designation as a state that “tolerates” terrorist financing could have sped up the 
Saudi response in two ways.  First, Saudi leaders would arguably have acted quickly to 
remove the stigma of the label, even if the economic and diplomatic sanctions were not 
detrimental to the country.  The Saudi government seeks to be the mouthpiece for Arab 
states in the Middle East, something hindered by a tarnished image in the international 
community.  Secondly, by labeling the country and specifically citing the evidence of 
Saudi complacency, the U.S. would likely garner multilateral support from the 
international community. 
D. VENEZUELA 
In the mid-2000s, some policymakers began advocating for Venezuela to be 
added to the list of state sponsors of terrorism.  Arguments for including Venezuela 
primarily centered on two concerns: the state’s support for Colombian terrorist groups, 
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primarily ELN and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and a 
deepening relationship between Venezuela and Iran.  While listing Venezuela has 
growing support in Congress, current U.S. policy is not flexible enough to accommodate 
this movement. 
Critics of Venezuela frequently cite Colombian accusations that the Venezuelan 
government allows ELN and FARC to use its territory to “rest and regroup, engage in 
narcotics trafficking, extort protection money, and kidnap Colombians to finance their 
operations.”211  At the same time, a recent report by the Congressional Research Service 
notes steadily improving relations between Venezuela and Colombia in the areas of 
terrorism and security matters.212  Indeed, as recently as last year, Venezuela extradited 
ELN and FARC members to Colombia for prosecution.213  Current U.S. policy requires 
the Secretary of State to assess a country’s “continued support for terrorism” before it is 
listed.  Venezuela’s current actions make the assertion that it consistently sponsors 
terrorist organizations weak at best.   
Those wanting to list Venezuela as a state sponsor because of its association with 
Iran miss the point of the list.  While a deepening relationship with one of our bitter rivals 
raises security concerns, it is not equivalent to supporting a terrorist organization.  To 
date, Iran and Venezuela have signed “a variety of agreements in agriculture, 
petrochemicals, oil exploration..., and the manufacturing of automobiles, bicycles, and 
tractors.”214  However, the commander of U.S. Southern Command “maintains that the 
focus of Iran in the region has been diplomatic and commercial,” not military.215  Listing 
Venezuela based solely on a political and economic relationship with a designated state 
sponsor of terrorism smacks of hegemonic bullying.  Indeed, it is blatantly hypocritical 
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for the U.S. to maintain ties with Syria while punishing another country for doing the 
same with another rogue nation. 
1. The New Typology: Venezuela and ELN 
The proposed typology, in contrast, offers the flexibility policymakers seek in 
cases like Venezuela.  Based on the State Department’s assessment of ELN’s activities 
within Venezuelan borders, the country falls into the “Toleration” category.  The U.S. 
can designate the country as such and apply low-level diplomatic and economic sanctions 
rather than the full weight of the currently mandated sanctions.  If evidence of 
Venezuelan logistical support becomes known, policymakers have the option to change 
the designation to “Support” and apply stiffer penalties, but still not equate the country to 
Iran or Syria.  The proposed typology allows for the employment of a wider variety of 
measures to encourage Venezuela to stop its support for terrorist organizations.  This 
flexibility may make the difference between coercing a desired change from the country 
rather than isolating it to the point Venezuela’s ties with Iran are its only option.  
E. PAKISTAN 
As discussed in Chapter I, Pakistan has been an active state sponsor of terrorism 
for decades.  However, this fact seems to have been ignored by the State Department, 
since Pakistan has never been on the list of state sponsors.  The reasons behind not listing 
Pakistan ostensibly have to do with the on-again, off-again relationship with the country.  
During the 1980s, Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) served as the primary 
conduit for delivering U.S. weapons to insurgent forces fighting the Soviet invasion in 
Afghanistan.  Following the Soviet withdrawal and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan soured, mostly due to Pakistan’s 
attempt to develop a nuclear capability.  After 9/11, U.S. interest in Pakistan once again 
peaked, this time because the country is a critical actor in the United States’ war on 
terror.  As recently as June of this year, President Obama clearly articulated the 
importance of Pakistan and its government’s efforts in fighting terrorism, particularly 
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against al Qaeda.216  However, Pakistan’s commitment to such efforts is dubious at best, 
a fact readily apparent when applying the proposed typology.   
1. The New Typology: Pakistan and AQ  
Since Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. has demonstrated a penchant for leaning 
on airpower when applying military force, particularly in the early stages of combat.  As 
such, a quick look at a map reveals the quickest way into Afghanistan from the myriad of 
bases established around the Persian Gulf during Desert Storm requires flying over 
Pakistan.  This simple fact necessitates ongoing relations with the Pakistani government 
to ensure a steady supply of resources for NATO troops in Afghanistan.   
What is often missing from this conversation is Pakistan’s direct and indirect role 
in establishing AQ in Afghanistan in the first place.  After the U.S. had lost interest in 
Afghanistan following the Soviet Union’s defeat, ISI continued supporting the Taliban.  
At that point, the Taliban was one of several groups vying for control of Afghanistan.  
What garnered the interest of the Pakistani government was the group’s Pashtun identity 
and the momentum it was gaining during the late 1990s.217  With the help of ISI and 
other Pashtun networks within Pakistan, Mullah Omar and the Taliban were able to 
secure almost all of Afghanistan.218  When bin Laden returned to Afghanistan in 1996, he 
had ample space to establish his training camps and begin planning attacks on U.S. 
interests. 
There is considerable evidence that by 2000 the relationship between Mullah 
Omar and bin Laden was tenuous at best.219  One way bin Laden was able to remain 
within his host’s good graces was to ensure Pakistan’s continued support.  To this end, 
bin Laden began a multi-pronged campaign in Pakistan to maintain good relations 
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between the country and his Taliban hosts.220  Bin Laden’s efforts were extremely 
successful in enhancing popular support within Pakistan by currying favor with the 
military and the media. 221   
After 9/11, Pakistan’s importance to Operation Enduring Freedom became clear, 
but Pakistan’s assistance in fighting AQ and the Taliban was frequently half-hearted or 
completely lacking.  While NATO aircraft were allowed to fly through Pakistani 
airspace, when their land forces were needed most, they were not there.  In 2002, during 
the battle of Tora Bora, U.S. forces had a sizable contingent of Taliban and AQ forces 
pinned down in a complex of mountain passes, caves and underground bunkers.  
Intelligence placed Osama bin Laden and several key lieutenants among this group of 
mujahideen fighters.222  Whether there were enough U.S. troops on the ground to move-
in and capture or kill AQ’s leader is a subject of continued debate.223  However, after 
days of fierce bombings and cave-to-cave searches, U.S. forces captured little more than 
some low-level fighters.  The Pakistani military forces who were supposed to be guarding 
the Afghanistan-Pakistan border were essentially non-existent.  Key leaders of the 
Taliban and AQ, along with hundreds of fighters, we allowed to move across the border 
and seek refuge in Pakistan, primarily in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas 
(FATA) in the northwest part of the country.224  Indeed, Michael Scheuer, former head of 
the the CIA’s bin Laden unit notes, “al Qaeda moved fighters to safety in Pakistan and 
beyond by using an informal but extraordinarily broad and effective support system, most 
of which had been operating for decades or, in the case of the tribes, for centuries.”225 
Years after Operation Enduring Freedom, questions of Pakistan’s commitment to 
fight terrorism persist.  A recent CRS report notes “recently uncovered evidence suggests 
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that the 9/11 hijackers were themselves based in western Pakistan in early 2001.”226  
Moreover, evidence indicates a strong relationship between AQ and LT, one of 
Pakistan’s primary benefactors, existed before 9/11.227  The dynamics of this relationship 
and AQ’s role in recent LT operations such as the 2006 Mumbai train bombings and the 
2008 Mumbai attacks are lingering questions.228  Finally, Pakistan has yet to fully 
account for bin Laden’s residence being less than a mile from a military academy.  
Indeed, the Obama administration purposely did not tell members of the Pakistani 
government of the impending raid to capture or kill bin Laden for fear he would be 
warned. 
At the same time, Pakistan has provided instrumental help in locating and 
capturing some of AQ’s most important members.  Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, 
and Khalid Sheik Mohammad were all captured within Pakistan with close cooperation 
between U.S. and Pakistani intelligence agencies.229  However, this cooperation does not 
absolve Pakistan of the assistance knowingly given to AQ and other terrorist 
organizations.  Indeed, while some AQ operatives may have been captured, many others 
survived and continue to operate within Pakistan.  Furthermore, there is evidence that 
support not only comes from within the country, but from Pakistani diaspora throughout 
the world.230 
Recognizing Pakistan’s critical role in the war on terrorism, U.S. policymakers 
understand they cannot officially add the country to the list of state sponsors of terrorism.  
Indeed, “any attempt to crack down on Pakistan will exacerbate distrust, resulting in 
increased Pakistani support for jihadists; coercive threats will undermine confidence 
without producing better results.”231  In contrast, the proposed typology offers the ability 
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to label a state as a sponsor of terrorism without the heavy-handed sanctions legally 
linked to current policy.  In the case of AQ, Pakistan has taken steps to cooperate with the 
U.S. to eliminate the organization.  However, this cooperation is incomplete.  As such, 
Pakistan would at least fall into the “Toleration” category on the spectrum of 
involvement.  However, questions linger on who within the Pakistani government was 
aware of bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad and what kind of support was provided to 
AQ’s leader.  Indeed, there is evidence of links between bin Laden and the ISI, a 
relationship that could have led to his protection following 9/11 and one that would likely 
put Pakistan in the “Support” category.232  However, rather than punishing Pakistan with 
substantial sanctions that would effectively end U.S. relations with the country, aid can 
be linked to the “Toleration” and “Support” categories.  By offering sponsoring states 
such as Pakistan assistance in curtailing support for terrorist organizations from elements 
within the government and the populace, the U.S can fight terrorism more effectively and 
at the same time bolster its image in the international community.   
F. CONCLUSION 
Not only is U.S. policy towards designating a state sponsor of terrorism flawed, 
but also the process for removing the designation is convoluted.  In the case of Libya, the 
country made clear overtures that it had forsaken terrorism, but remained on the list until 
the U.S. had extracted unrelated concessions from the government.  North Korea, on the 
other hand, never made such declarations, but came off the list as a part of negotiations 
on the country’s nuclear weapon capability.  In both cases, a graduated system of labels 
based on evidence of the country’s compliance would have allowed for clear guidance on 
how the country comes off the list and rewards the sponsoring state for taking the 
appropriate actions. 
The proposed typology also offers policymakers an avenue for identifying state 
sponsors of terrorism without the oppressive sanctions that would likely end relationships 
the U.S. needs.  There are certain states the U.S. must effectively deal with to further our 
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national interests.  Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Pakistan are three such countries with 
some bearing on U.S. national security.  Current U.S. policy towards state sponsors of 
terrorism would effectively end relationships that the U.S. values to some extent.  In 
contrast, the proposed typology offers a means of identifying these states as sponsors of 
terrorism, but only in the context that they “Tolerate” organizations within their borders.  
Rather than sanctions, that can damage the global economy, the typology might offer 
these states assistance in defeating these groups thereby building international ties while 
making the world safer.   
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 As demonstrated by the cases in the previous two chapters, current U.S. policy 
towards state-sponsored terrorism is problematic.  This thesis has argued that the end 
result of the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism is inadequate.  
Furthermore, when we resort to that list, we are guilty of a double standard.  The most 
prominent example of this double standard is the U.S. and its own history of state 
sponsored terrorism.  This chapter begins by examining the U.S. government’s 
relationship with the IRA through an American NGO.  Then, a recent policy initiative 
that attempts to distinguish between levels of support is examined, identifying its 
strengths and weaknesses. Finally, the advantages of the proposed typology are 
summarized and areas for further study are discussed. 
A. THE UNITED STATES 
The problems with the current list stem primarily from its inflexibility.  U.S. law 
currently mandates a host of sanctions be put in place when a state is designated as a 
sponsor of terrorism.  As such, policymakers must carefully consider the ramifications of 
designating a state as a sponsor.  The severe sanctions imposed could not only alienate a 
necessary ally, but could also have disastrous second-order effects on the economy.  
States that are not on the State Department’s list but are consistent supporters of terrorism 
serve as a convenient reference for critics of the U.S. government’s double standard.  The 
list itself, however, is not the only case of U.S. hypocrisy towards state-sponsored 
terrorism.  During the 1970s and 1980s, multiple U.S. government agencies and political 
officials tacitly supported the PIRA.  Large sums of money were raised in cities all over 
the U.S. and then delivered by American citizens to the terrorist organization in Northern 
Ireland.  It would take over a decade before the U.S. would make a concerted effort to 
create and enforce laws to curtail the NGOs responsible for this fundraising.   
As the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland began to turn violent in 1969, 
Michael Flannery and two other IRA members exiled to the U.S. saw a worthwhile cause.  
Together they formed the Irish Northern Aid Committee, popularly known as NORAID.  
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The expressed purpose of the organization was to educate the Irish-American population 
and gather their support for the Catholics of Northern Ireland, particularly in the form of 
cash.  Purportedly this money was to provide humanitarian services, particularly to 
children.  “Since traditionally the IRA has supported the families of jailed IRA men, this 
would put a great financial strain on the organization.  Irish-American money would help 
alleviate that strain.”233  However, it was not long before “most people in Britain and 
many Americans firmly believe[d] that the United States [was] primarily responsible for 
funding the IRA,” through various NGOs, NORAID in particular.234 
A year and a half after Flannery established the first NORAID office in the 
Bronx, NORAID chapters were formed in “Manhattan, Queens, Staten Island,...Long 
Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Washington, D.C., Baltimore, Philadelphia, Boston, 
Buffalo, Chicago, St. Louis, and Detroit.”235  In the early days of NORAID, money was 
primarily raised through collection jars in bars and restaurants.  As the organization grew, 
the fundraising became increasingly spectacular.  In 1972, a fundraising concert was held 
in Carnegie Hall and a car was raffled off.236  Beginning in 1973, an annual charity 
dinner was held in the lavish Astorian Manor.  Notable attendees included the head of the 
powerful longshoremen union, the president of the Teamsters, and a variety of 
Congressmen and other politicians.  Similar dinners were held in major cities all over the 
country, each expected to bring in $20,000 to $30,000.237   
While it was popularly believed that U.S. dollars constituted the bulk of the IRA’s 
income, the reality was different.  By some estimates, in the early 1970s, “NORAID 
managed to supply more than 50% of the cash needed by the IRA.”238  However, as the 
IRA grew and British intelligence on the organization improved, the number of 
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volunteers ending up in prison increased as well.  On average, NORAID was providing 
over $100,000 to the IRA annually.  British intelligence estimated the expenditures 
required to support the families of those imprisoned, ostensibly the purpose of 
NORAID’s funds, at over $260,000.239  While NORAID’s assistance did not cover the 
full amount, every U.S. dollar spent to assist these families freed up IRA funds for 
weapons. 
Support for NORAID within the U.S. became politically fashionable and rampant 
throughout the 1970s.  Eventually four prominent Irish-American politicians, Senators 
Edward Kennedy and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Representative Thomas “Tip” O’Neill, 
and New York City Mayor Hugh Carey, issued a statement condemning all support for 
the PIRA.  Yet, NORAID continued to bring in sizable sums of money.240  The few FBI 
attempts to investigate and disrupt the flow of funds were only minimally successful, 
even though officials recognized that NORAID’s support, “has become a serious problem 
and a source of embarrassment for the United States.”241  
NORAID’s success would continue until the PIRA assassination of Lord 
Mountbatten in 1979.  Justice Department reports attributed a slow, but steady decline in 
the funds coming from the U.S. during the late-1970s to the growing atrocities of the 
PIRA.242  The Mountbatten assassination would serve as the critical blow to the PIRA’s 
popularity in the U.S. due to the tremendous publicity of the event.  In the wake of the 
horrific deaths of the popular royal and several of his family members, Irish-American 
support rapidly diminished.  Moreover, “the FBI and other [U.S.] law enforcement 
agencies bowed to pressure from the British government to move against [PIRA] 
supporters in America, and particularly NORAID.”243  The hunger strikes implemented 
by PIRA prisoners in 1981 revitalized support in the U.S. as well as in Northern Ireland, 
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but it would prove to be “only a passing rallying cause that briefly united the Irish-
Americans behind the [PIRA].”244 
In 1981, a “district court judge ruled that NORAID was ‘an agent of the [PIRA] 
providing money and services for other than relief purposes’.”245  Two years later, FBI 
efforts to stem the flow of money and weapons to Ireland began to show significant 
progress.  NORAID was forced to create a new fund to finance the defense of U.S. 
sympathizers caught in FBI sting operations.246  U.S. dollars that were originally going to 
Northern Ireland were being re-directed to defense lawyers.  Finally, in 1986, “President 
Reagan helped push the Supplementary Treaty through the Senate.”247  The treaty 
specifically “excluded violent acts from being treated as political offenses.”248  No longer 
would PIRA members be able to claim political asylum within the U.S. 
The above case offers two important lessons for U.S. policymakers.  First, 
democracy in general, and specifically the U.S., is not immune from state sponsorship of 
terrorism.  A sizeable segment of the U.S. population funded a portion of the PIRA’s 
operations while government agencies turned a blind eye.  The proposed typology would 
classify this as “Toleration.”  The second lesson is that policymakers must recognize 
there are degrees of state sponsorship and a laundry list of sanctions does not constitute a 
fix for all types.  The simple fact is some form of sponsorship can occur within all types 
of government.  Furthermore, it can take years to address the problem.  Even after the 
Mountbatten assassination, it took several years before U.S. government actions began to 
see results. 
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B. RECENT PROGRESS: “STATES NOT FULLY COOPERATING WITH 
UNITED STATES ANTI-TERRORISM EFFORTS” 
In 2002, the U.S. government codified a law that created a distinct category for 
states that do not openly support international terrorist organizations but do not take 
positive action to curtail them either.  Title 22, section 2781 states “No defense article or 
defense service may be sold or licensed for export...to a foreign country that the President 
determines and certifies to Congress...is not cooperating fully with United States 
antiterrorism efforts.”249  States designated as “Not Fully Cooperating” by the President 
are identified in the Federal Register and the State Department reports on their status in 
the annual Country Reports.  This law represents a step in the right direction.  It 
recognizes that a distinction exists between state sponsors of terrorism and those states 
that simply tolerate a terrorist organization’s existence.  However, implementation of this 
law has been problematic. 
First, the only consequence of being labeled a state that does “Not Fully 
Cooperate” is a total ban on defense weapons and services.  On the surface, this seems 
prudent.  However, in some cases the state may not be employing an effective counter-
terrorism strategy because the terrorists outgun it.  Like the State Department’s list of 
state sponsors, the law applied to states “Not Fully Cooperating” allows for no flexibility 
and offers little incentive for states to come off the list.  Second, and more importantly, 
the label is based solely on the President’s discretion.  The law offers no criteria for how 
states should be designated.  Therefore, like the State Department’s list of state sponsors, 
the tendency will be to utilize this designation as a tool for political extortion.  Proof of 
such use is found simply by looking at the current list of states “Not Fully Cooperating.”   
Today, the list includes Iran, Syria, Cuba, North Korea, Venezuela, and Eritrea.  
Three states on the list are also listed as state sponsors of terrorism and, therefore, are 
already under economic sanctions and weapons embargoes.  Similarly, North Korea, 
despite being removed from the list of state sponsors, is still under weapons embargoes 
dating back to the Korean War.  Therefore, the only two countries on the list that could 
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possibly be affected by such restrictions are Venezuela and Eritrea.  In both cases, the 
label is sensible, based on the State Department’s assessment in the 2010 Country 
Reports.250  Neither country has adequately addressed terrorist organizations operating 
within its borders to the satisfaction of the United States or the international community.  
However, whether or not a complete ban on defense exports alone is sufficient to coerce a 
change in policy remains to be seen. 
C. BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSED TYPOLOGY 
The advantages of the proposed typology over current U.S. policy primarily stem 
from its flexibility.  By recognizing that there is a spectrum of involvement between a 
state government and a terrorist organization and that sponsorship comes in multiple 
forms, policymakers allow for a tailored response to state-sponsored terrorism.  The 
heavy-handed sanctions mandated by current U.S. law amount to a one-size-fits-all 
approach that is completely ineffective.  In contrast, the proposed typology offers the 
opportunity to address a specific level of involvement between the offending state and the 
terrorist organization.  Different instruments of power are employed to counter the 
particular form of support provided by the state.  The level of involvement determines 
how that instrument of power is employed.  This is not to say states will only be punished 
for their involvement with a terrorist organization.  To the contrary, a complete response 
would include incentives for offending states to change their policies.  Indeed, 
downgrading a state on the spectrum of involvement, from “Support” to “Toleration” for 
example, could itself serve as an incentive. 
Another advantage of the new typology is that it offers a common lexicon to 
describe how states sponsor a terrorist organization and the nature of the relationship 
between the state and the organization.  U.S. policymakers would be better able to 
articulate an offending state’s relationship with terrorism, the forms of support it 
provided to the organization, and how the U.S. response will affect that involvement.  
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Terrorism," 17, 147–48. 
 73 
Such an explanation not only clarifies U.S. intentions and fosters improved cooperation, 
but it also perpetuates U.S. credibility within the international community. 
Finally, the proposed typology offers the means to counter claims of U.S. 
hypocrisy in the war on terror.  Tailored responses that provide incentives as well as 
punitive measures offer a means of confronting important allies that sponsor terrorist 
organizations.  The complex world of international politics occasionally requires 
relationships with states that do not fully agree with the U.S. views of terrorism.  By 
consistently applying the designations described in the proposed typology to allies as well 
as adversaries, the U.S. bolsters its credibility within the international community and 
solidifies its role as a leader in the war on terrorism.  A necessary step, however, is for 
policymakers to acknowledge that the U.S. itself would have been labeled a sponsor of 
terrorism not too long ago and that an effective counter-terrorism strategy starts from 
within a state’s borders. 
1. Comparing the State Department’s List with the Proposed Typology 
Figure 3 offers a summary of how the current State Department List of state 
sponsors of terrorism has been employed and how it compares with the proposed 
typology.
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Figure 3.   Comparison between State Department’s List of State Sponsors of Terrorism and the Proposed Typology
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Today, Iran and Syria are overt sponsors of multiple terrorist organizations.  
However, as discussed in Chapter II, a distinction must be made between the two since 
Syria is seen as an essential element in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process.  In the case of the 
new typology, the “Sponsor” designation would be applied to both states.  The distinction 
would manifest itself in differing types of economic and diplomatic sanctions that 
specifically address the forms of support each state provides. 
In 1996, Sudan took a monumental step in eliminating its support for terrorism, 
which would have resulted in the downgrade from “Sponsor” to “Supporter.”  By 2003, 
the State Department noted significant progress in the country’s counter-terrorism efforts.  
At the same time, Sudan continues to allow elements of HAMAS and Hizballah to exist 
within its borders, necessitating a “Toleration” designation. 
Cuba renounced its involvement with terrorism in 1992.  While the State 
Department continues to cite ELN and FARC members residing within the country, 
evidence of support for the organizations themselves is nonexistent.  Therefore, Cuba 
should come off the list. 
In the case of Libya, by expelling ANO in 1994, Qaddafi demonstrated a dramatic 
shift in foreign policy.  The overtures made toward normalizing U.S.-Libyan relations in 
1999 would have potentially prompted a further downgrade on the spectrum of 
involvement.  However, the State Department noted residual connections through 2005, 
including questions surrounding the country’s involvement in the attempted assassination 
of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah.251  As such, Libya would have maintained a 
“Supporter” designation until the state could adequately prove its ties with terrorism were 
completely severed.  Country Reports after 2006 noted such changes, allowing the state 
to come off the list of state sponsors. 
In addition to the bombing of KAL 858, North Korea actively used agents of the 
state throughout the 1980s to kidnap Japanese citizens and commit other acts of sedition 
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meant to destabilize the South Korean government.  Despite claims to the contrary in 
1995, recent evidence indicates the North Korean government continued to support 
multiple terrorist organizations by selling them arms and assisting with the construction 
of tunnels and bunkers.  While this form of support is slightly different from the other 
examples since there are no ideological ties, it still constitutes “Support” for terrorism. 
As discussed briefly in Chapter II, Iraq was one of the original members of the 
State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism.  The country was removed during 
the 1980s to facilitate U.S. military assistance during the Iran-Iraq war.  However, no 
evidence was produced to demonstrate the state had actually dissolved its ties with 
terrorist organizations such as ANO.  Therefore, according to the new typology, Iraq 
would maintain the label of a “Sponsor” of terrorism until the overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime in 2003. 
In the case of Saudi Arabia, evidence indicates the flow of funds for the 
insurgency in Afghanistan continued after the Soviets were expelled.  Moreover, it is 
clear that bin Laden took full advantage of this support during the 1990s.  Until 2003, 
Saudi Arabia has overtly “Tolerated” fundraising for terrorist organizations.  After 
multiple attacks within the kingdom itself, strong measures were taken to curtail the flow 
of funds.  However, the State Department argues the Saudi government must do more.  
Therefore, the designation remains. 
As discussed in Chapter III, recent evidence indicates that some form of 
relationship exists between Venezuela, ELN, and FARC.  At the same time, the 
Venezuelan government has taken clear steps towards a counterterrorism strategy in 
conjunction with Colombia and other Latin America states.  Therefore, designation as a 
state that “Tolerates” terrorism is likely the strongest measure that can be taken. 
Pakistan’s haphazard approach to combating terrorism is simply not enough.  
While several key AQ members were captured or killed with Pakistani assistance, the bin 
Laden question remains.  Furthermore, efforts to stop the Kashmiri terrorist 
organizations, such as LT, have been minimal at best.  As such, Pakistan continues to be 
designated as a “Sponsor.” 
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Finally, the U.S. government made little effort to stop NORAID even though the 
true purpose of the organization was common knowledge.  Indeed, the organization 
became so popular, it attracted politicians and other high-ranking members of society to 
fundraising events.  FBI efforts to curtail the organization, coupled with excessive PIRA 
violence, effectively marginalized NORAID’s fundraising in the late 1980s. 
D. FUTURE AREAS OF STUDY 
The proposed typology offered by this paper is only the first step in establishing 
an improved U.S. policy towards state-sponsored terrorism.  Additional research is 
required to make the new typology a practical option for policymakers.  First, while 
Chapter I describes the forms sponsorship can take and the spectrum of involvement 
between the state and the terrorist organization, more can be done to codify and establish 
criteria for each category.  Second, this thesis addresses only a handful of states that need 
to be examined and possibly labeled.  A host of other states support terrorism to varying 
degrees.  A comprehensive and consistent policy must consider all of them.  Finally, 
identifying specific responses for each level of involvement that employs the most 
appropriate instrument of power is a critical step towards making the typology an 
effective policy tool.   
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